Am Montag, 25. April 2016, 15:44:04 schrieb Sven M. Hallberg:
Hi Sven,
> Hi Stephan, thanks for your reply!
>
> Stephan Mueller <smuel...@chronox.de> on Fri, Apr 22 2016:
> >> > The main
> >> > improvements compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide
Am Freitag, 22. April 2016, 15:58:19 schrieb Fedor Brunner:
Hi Fedor,
> Hi Stephan,
> could you please compare your RNG design with OpenBSD arc4random based
> on ChaCha20.
Ok, I try in the following. But please bear with me as I have not studied the
OpenBSD RNG design to the fullest extent.
Am Freitag, 22. April 2016, 16:49:54 schrieb Sven M. Hallberg:
Hi Sven,
> > I developed a different approach, which I call Linux Random Number
> > Generator (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main
> > improvements compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient
>
Am Donnerstag, 19. Dezember 2013, 09:58:06 schrieb Natanael:
Hi Natanael,
It's always a good idea to use several entropy sources and
cryptographically mix their outputs into your pool. They won't reduce
your total entropy either way, any predictable sources will only be
adding less entropy than
Am Dienstag, 3. Dezember 2013, 15:25:22 schrieb coderman:
Hi coderman,
On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 11:02 PM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de
wrote:
...
Interesting: I have the same type of discussion (SP800-90B) to prepare
(and
even went through it -- see [1]) and I do not see
Am Sonntag, 1. Dezember 2013, 20:27:34 schrieb d...@deadhat.com:
Hi dj,
I would not characterize the Linux RNG issue as fully resolved in any
way. Until every CPU maker includes a source of entropy by design (instead
of by accident) and the Kernel gets off its high horse and chooses to use
Am Montag, 2. Dezember 2013, 23:16:28 schrieb d...@deadhat.com:
Hi dj,
the work that you have done to make hardware entropy sources readily
available in Intel chips should be commended, and i certainly
appreciate it. i will however continue to complain until it is even
better, with
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 11:31:49 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Aloha!
Stephan Mueller wrote:
The problem is that dieharder Co only show the statistical quality.
Based on my real-world attempts to the CPU jitter issue used as a
noise source for /dev/random
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 11:22:29 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Aloha!
Stephan Mueller wrote:
I am doing a lot of research in this area these days. If you imply
that main storage means RAM outside the caches, I think your
statement is not entirely correct.
Yes
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 11:22:29 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Very cool. How does [1] compare functionally to jytter?
http://jytter.blogspot.se/
I very briefly checked, but it seems that the author's consideration takes
interrupts and the like as the basis for the
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 11:55:41 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
Hi,
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 11:22:29 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Very cool. How does [1] compare functionally to jytter?
http://jytter.blogspot.se/
I very briefly checked, but it seems that the author's
Am Freitag, 29. November 2013, 16:06:07 schrieb stef:
Hi stef,
On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 11:22:29AM +0100, Joachim Strömbergson wrote:
What I was trying to say is that Havege running on MCUs (AVR, AVR32,
PIC, PIC32, ARM Cortex M0 etc) where instructions in general takes the
same number of
Am Donnerstag, 28. November 2013, 10:01:06 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Aloha!
coderman wrote:
On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 10:09 AM, Joachim Strömbergson
joac...@strombergson.com wrote:
... I have concerns though on embedded SSL stacks that use Havege
as entropy source on
Am Donnerstag, 28. November 2013, 10:12:19 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Aloha!
Stephan Mueller wrote:
The only challenge that I see with Havege is that the algorithm is
quite complex and that the description does not fully explain why and
where the entropy comes from
Am Donnerstag, 28. November 2013, 10:19:08 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
Hi Joachim,
Aloha!
Stephan Mueller wrote:
I would not concur with this statment: at runtime, you cannot verify
entropy beyond simple pattern checks. Moreover, compression (i.e.
whitening) is not meaningful
Am Donnerstag, 28. November 2013, 15:36:59 schrieb Fabio Pietrosanti:
Hi Fabio,
Greetings,
following the answer on thread on the HAVEGE algorithm as an additional
entropy source, at GlobaLeaks Project we are evaluating whenever not to
add also rngd that's said to be able to use other
Am Dienstag, 26. November 2013, 14:33:54 schrieb coderman:
Hi coderman,
On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 10:09 AM, Joachim Strömbergson
joac...@strombergson.com wrote:
...
I have concerns though on embedded SSL stacks that use Havege as
entropy
source on MCUs such as AVR32 and ARM.
...
On
Am Mittwoch, 27. November 2013, 12:00:50 schrieb coderman:
Hi coderman,
On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 3:10 AM, Stephan Mueller smuel...@chronox.de
wrote:
...
The way haveged is implemented, not really. The reason is that it uses
clock_gettime, which uses the Linux kernel clocksource framework
18 matches
Mail list logo
