Re: [cryptography] LastPass have been hacked, so it seems.

losing your keys due to password database corruption, commercialization of the tool or whatever, since they are all in separate files that you can decrypt with GPG by hand if needed. tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://list

Re: [cryptography] Cryptanalysis of RADIUS MD5 cipher?

. In diabolicly bad implementations, you could even argue for full decryption of the password through timing side channels, but that's probably tough to pull off in practice. tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Cryptanalysis of RADIUS MD5 cipher?

escription of the cipher, it seems like the there's opportunity for padding oracle attacks, provided the server somehow indicates (through timing or otherwise) whether the 0 padding is valid. tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randomb

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

d solution, not an even more centralized one > than mailing lists. +1 tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

[cryptography] SSH small RSA public exponent

ns on the history of e=3 at http://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/8454/ Thanks, Tim. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Fatal flaw in Taiwanese smart card RNG

t for a discrete set of common mistakes. Generic statistical tests usually aren't helpful here. Instead, tests targeted at well-known weak generators or seed methods would be quite handy in my line of work. tim ___ cryptography mailing l

Re: [cryptography] "best practices" for hostname validation when using JSSE

ries which check certs and which are designed for HTTPS, you probably want to use the DNS name. I don't know enough about JSSE-specific implementation to be able to give you a precise answer. - Tim On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 3:03 PM, Patrick Pelletier wrote: > One thing mentioned in the "

Re: [cryptography] OT: Ulf Möller

BLitauen%26hl%3Den%26tbo%3Dd&sa=X&ei=sWLKUO3pGMSN0QHD14C4Dg&ved=0CFQQ7gEwAw> Here's a press release from the prosecutor's office: http://www.presse.sachsen-anhalt.de/index.php?&cmd=get&id=852615&identifier=3bf095c0d8865dccd0ea7ef44e5f0bae; it has an e-mail addres

Re: [cryptography] Secure Remote Password (SRP) and Plaintext Emil Address

y be documented as accepted. As an aside unless you have explicitly asked for it, it's unlikely that the pentest is going to be alligned against any particular UK data security requirements. (I'm don't even think there are any that are relevant in this context - unless maybe

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

long it will take to crack--a key long enough to be safe for 60 days against all attackers may take your trustee a couple of years to crack once you're dead). - Tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

[cryptography] Why do scammers say they're from Nigeria?

victims the Nigerian scammer has an over-riding need to reduce false positives. By sending an email that repels all but the most gullible the scammer gets the most promising marks to self-select, and tilts the true to false positive ratio in his favor. - Tim

Re: [cryptography] Intel RNG

a comparable budget, I'd consider further investigation. - Tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

[cryptography] Voynich Manuscript now online

An interesting item in the historical record, even if it's not actually a code (this is my understanding of the current best hypothesis): http://beinecke.library.yale.edu/digitallibrary/voynich.html - Tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptog

Re: [cryptography] kernel.org hack and kernel integrity

e is no code in git that anticipates needing crypto hash agility.) Anyway, I hope this helps. When I was learning git, I found the paper _Git from the bottom up_ by John Wiegley very helpful for understanding what is going on inside git: http://newartisans.com/2008/04/git-from-the

Re: [cryptography] obfuscating symbols without increasing their size

13252491. I found http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/thorp.pdf linked-to from the Wikipedia Feistel cipher article. It has some citations that will get you further in the literature. - Tim ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] obfuscating symbols without increasing their size

in number of the bits (suitable to minimize the possibility of salt collision across the number of tokens to be encrypted with a single key). Map the salt to token-legal grammar and emit encoded tokens by prepending the salt to your (token-encoded) encrypted result (you may need something somewhat