On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 12:36 PM, wrote:
>
> |
> | let's take just one of the above as an example: high-value monetary
> | transactions - the only item in the list that I am somewhat familiar
> | with.
> |
> | I can not think of a single scenario where the two parties that do
> | that, pre
|
| let's take just one of the above as an example: high-value monetary
| transactions - the only item in the list that I am somewhat familiar
| with.
|
| I can not think of a single scenario where the two parties that do
| that, prefer a trust chain that includes a third party for introd
On 12/09/11 19:12, Marsh Ray wrote:
On 09/12/2011 01:45 PM, M.R. wrote:
The system is not expected to protect individual
liberty, life or limb, nor is it expected to protect high-value
monetary transactions, intellectual property assets, state secrets
or critical civic infrastructure operations.
On 09/12/2011 02:50 PM, Ian G wrote:
On 13/09/2011, at 5:12, Marsh Ray wrote:
It never was, and yet, it is asked to do that routinely today.
This is where threat modeling falls flat.
The more generally useful a communications facility that you
develop, the less knowledge and control the eng
On 13/09/2011, at 5:12, Marsh Ray wrote:
> It never was, and yet, it is asked to do that routinely today.
>
> This is where threat modeling falls flat.
>
> The more generally useful a communications facility that you develop, the
> less knowledge and control the engineer has about the condit
On 09/12/2011 01:45 PM, M.R. wrote:
The system is not expected to protect individual
liberty, life or limb, nor is it expected to protect high-value
monetary transactions, intellectual property assets, state secrets
or critical civic infrastructure operations.
It never was, and yet, it is asked
In my, rather mundane world of corporate security, the threat model
must answer (at the very least) the following questions:
1) What is the upper bound of the loss of protected asset?
2) Who is the attacker and what are his capabilities?
3) What is the estimated cost of mounting a successful at
On 13/09/2011, at 0:15, "M.R." wrote:
> In these long and extensive discussions about "fixing PKI" there
> seems to be a fair degree of agreement that one of the reasons
> for the current difficulties is the fact that there was no precisely
> defined threat model, documented and agreed upon ~be
M.R.,
> In these long and extensive discussions about "fixing PKI" there
> seems to be a fair degree of agreement that one of the reasons
> for the current difficulties is the fact that there was no precisely
> defined threat model, documented and agreed upon ~before~ the
> "SSL system" was desig
On Sep 12, 2011, at 7:15 AM, M.R. wrote:
> In these long and extensive discussions about "fixing PKI" there
> seems to be a fair degree of agreement that one of the reasons
> for the current difficulties is the fact that there was no precisely
> defined threat model, documented and agreed upon ~b
In these long and extensive discussions about "fixing PKI" there
seems to be a fair degree of agreement that one of the reasons
for the current difficulties is the fact that there was no precisely
defined threat model, documented and agreed upon ~before~ the
"SSL system" was designed and deployed.
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