On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 2:01 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 19 January 2013 07:45, James A. Donald wrote:
>> On 2013-01-19 2:14 AM, ianG wrote:
>>>
>>> Also, the confounded users tend to lose their phones or have them stolen.
>>> And then they demand their 'identities' back, as if nothing has happene
On 19 January 2013 07:45, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 2013-01-19 2:14 AM, ianG wrote:
>>
>> Also, the confounded users tend to lose their phones or have them stolen.
>> And then they demand their 'identities' back, as if nothing has happened.
>> So the keys need to be agile, in some sense. Which
On 2013-01-19 2:14 AM, ianG wrote:
Also, the confounded users tend to lose their phones or have them
stolen. And then they demand their 'identities' back, as if nothing
has happened. So the keys need to be agile, in some sense. Which
pushes us away from the phone, to cloud, or a variant, and
On Jan 18, 2013, at 5:14 PM, d...@geer.org wrote:
>
> As to secure storage, ya'll might find cleversafe.com interesting.
Yup.
There is also Tahoe-LAFS ( https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs ), the
Least-Authority File System
"Tahoe-LAFS is a Free and Open cloud storage system. It distribute
As to secure storage, ya'll might find cleversafe.com interesting.
--dan
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On Jan 18, 2013, at 2:04 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 18, 2013, at 11:14 AM, ianG wrote:
>>
>>> On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
> To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
>
On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>
> On Jan 18, 2013, at 11:14 AM, ianG wrote:
>
>> On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
>>>
>>> > To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
>>> > their public key,...
>>>
>>> Would re-analyzing all this in a
On Jan 18, 2013, at 11:14 AM, ianG wrote:
> On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
>>
>> > To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
>> > their public key,...
>>
>> Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
>> a name-centric model offer any
On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
> To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> their public key,...
Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
that the key is the identity
James A. Donald wrote:
On 2013-01-18 1:17 AM, Thierry Moreau wrote:
First, replace "client certificate" by client PPKP (public-private
key pair) and be ready for a significant training exercise. The
more the trainee knows about X.509, the greater challenge for the
trainer.
It has been decisiv
On 2013-01-18 1:17 AM, Thierry Moreau wrote:
First, replace "client certificate" by client PPKP (public-private
key pair) and be ready for a significant training exercise. The
more the trainee knows about X.509, the greater challenge for the
trainer.
It has been decisively and repeatedly demon
d...@geer.org wrote:
> To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> their public key,...
Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
that the key is the identity and "Dan" is an attribut
On 2013-01-17 12:21 PM, d...@geer.org wrote:
> To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> their public key,...
Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
that the key is the identity
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 9:21 PM, wrote:
>
> > To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> > their public key,...
>
> Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
> a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
> that the key is the id
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 9:21 PM, wrote:
>
> > To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> > their public key,...
>
> Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
> a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
> that the key is the id
> To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> their public key,...
Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
that the key is the identity and "Dan" is an attribute of that
key; name-ce
On 2013-01-17 11:38 AM, James A. Donald wrote:
The end game is passwords with srp. Even if you are using client side
certificates, you have to be able to get your PC client side
certificates onto your smartphone, which requires that you sign on to
your PC using a password.
To clarify: I
On 2013-01-17 9:02 AM, Adam Back wrote:
There was a subthread in this huge PKI-is-failing and doesnt solve
phishing
thread looking at what might solve phishing (modulo engineering and
deployment issues).
To summarize Ian & Ben mentioned and I add a few:
- client side certificates
- password ma
Hi Adam,
A few thoughts
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Adam Back wrote:
> There was a subthread in this huge PKI-is-failing and doesnt solve phishing
> thread looking at what might solve phishing (modulo engineering and
> deployment issues).
>
> To summarize Ian & Ben mentioned and I add a
There was a subthread in this huge PKI-is-failing and doesnt solve phishing
thread looking at what might solve phishing (modulo engineering and
deployment issues).
To summarize Ian & Ben mentioned and I add a few:
- client side certificates
- password managers
- browser auth
- TPM to make creden
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