Re: [cryptography] Thawte

2011-09-08 Thread jd.cypherpunks
thanks! Michael ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

[cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

2011-09-08 Thread Ralph Holz
Hi, I (still) cannot believe how Symantec reacts to the DigiNotar breaches - basically ignoring the known shortcomings: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/why-your-certificate-authority-matters Marketing department speaking, no doubt. Ralph -- Dipl.-Inform. Ralph Holz I8: Network

Re: [cryptography] Thawte

2011-09-08 Thread Jan-Frode Myklebust
On Wed, Sep 07, 2011 at 03:54:08PM +0200, jd.cypherpunks wrote: Thawte is part of Verisign, that is a spin-off from RSA Security. Am I right? Close, but it's the other RSA. A.k.a. Republic of South Africa. -jf ___ cryptography mailing list

Re: [cryptography] Thawte

2011-09-08 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jan-Frode Myklebust writes: On Wed, Sep 07, 2011 at 03:54:08PM +0200, jd.cypherpunks wrote: Thawte is part of Verisign, that is a spin-off from RSA Security. Am I right? Close, but it's the other RSA. A.k.a. Republic of South Africa. Verisign is an early spin-off from RSA Security.

Re: [cryptography] GlobalSign temporarily ceases issuance of all certificates

2011-09-08 Thread Ian G
On 08/09/2011, at 11:31, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: The SSL/public CA model did an admirable job in that regard and Taher ElGamal and Paul Kocher deserve full credit for this accomplishment. As long as we can document that original model, I'm inclined to agree. SSL's

Re: [cryptography] PKI fixes that don't fix PKI (part II)

2011-09-08 Thread Ian G
Hi, Lucky, good to see some perspective! On 08/09/2011, at 8:52, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: o Changes to OCSP . The problem was that the top three CA vendors at the time, RSA Security, VeriSign, and Netscape didn't have a comprehensive database of certificates issued by

Re: [cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

2011-09-08 Thread Andy Steingruebl
On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 1:30 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote: Hi, I (still) cannot believe how Symantec reacts to the DigiNotar breaches - basically ignoring the known shortcomings: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/why-your-certificate-authority-matters To be contrarian for a

Re: [cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

2011-09-08 Thread Ralph Holz
Hi, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/why-your-certificate-authority-matters To be contrarian for a moment [...] This isn't to say it justifies or supports the marketing campaign, but perhaps there is a real message hidden in there after all? That would be a really far-sighted

Re: [cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

2011-09-08 Thread Alfonso De Gregorio
Hi, On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 6:20 PM, Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.comwrote: On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 1:30 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote: Hi, I (still) cannot believe how Symantec reacts to the DigiNotar breaches - basically ignoring the known shortcomings:

Re: [cryptography] Symantec gets it wrong

2011-09-08 Thread Nico Williams
On Thu, Sep 8, 2011 at 1:53 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote: btw Massive kudos to the comodo hacker if his 'sploits are accurately bragged, favor he did the SSL/PKI community indeed.  There were multiple files posted as trophies so I presume people have verified. Whether they're for

[cryptography] [OT] After Digital Certificate Hack, Mozilla Seeks Reassurances

2011-09-08 Thread Jeffrey Walton
I wonder how many CAs are going to report back with defects and promises that they will fix? http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/239699/after_digital_certificate_hack_mozilla_seeks_reassurances.html In emails sent out to digital certificate authorities Thursday, Mozilla Certificate

[cryptography] Running a keyserver is valuable OR pairwise attacks on public keys

2011-09-08 Thread Tom Ritter
A long time ago I read an account on a website of a test done in the 90s on public RSA keys. A keyserver operator was politely asked for the entire database of public keys, and he complied (I think it was the MIT keyserver and the researchers were at MIT, but I don't recall.) The public keys

Re: [cryptography] PKI fixes that don't fix PKI (part III)

2011-09-08 Thread James A. Donald
On 2011-09-09 9:11 AM, Lucky Green wrote: - while it is possible to build communication systems that use some of the components of the SSL system that withstand governmental security services interception (I have designed and deployed such systems myself) yurls? an entirely different system