Re: [cryptography] Diginotar Lessons Learned (long)

2011-09-11 Thread Ian G
On 11/09/2011, at 10:02, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2011-09-11 9:10 AM, Andy Steingruebl wrote: 1. Phishing isn't the only problem right? Malware + breaches might be the other 2 biggies. Note that the malware/pc takeover market was probably financed by profits from

Re: [cryptography] Diginotar Lessons Learned (long)

2011-09-11 Thread James A. Donald
On 2011-09-11 9:10 AM, Andy Steingruebl wrote: 1. Phishing isn't the only problem right? On 2011-09-11 7:44 PM, Ian G wrote: Malware + breaches might be the other 2 biggies. We now know in principle how to make malware resistant operating systems,

Re: [cryptography] PKI fixes that don't fix PKI (part III)

2011-09-11 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 8:58 AM, Ian G i...@iang.org wrote: On 11/09/2011, at 7:50, Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote: On Sep 10, 2011, at 4:14 00PM, John Levine wrote: [SNIP] The issue, then, is one of motivation -- given the current market price for stolen credit card

[cryptography] After the dust settles -- what happens next? (v. Long)

2011-09-11 Thread Ian G
Lucky Peter said: Moreover, I noticed that some posts list one or more desirable properties and requirements together with a proposed solution. That's the nice thing about PKI, there's more than enough fail to go around. So, what happens now? As we all observe, there are two approaches

[cryptography] [OT]: SQL injection blamed for widespread DNS hack

2011-09-11 Thread Jeffrey Walton
While PKI has many shortcomings, DigiNotar has shown the industry can effectively kill off a deficient CA. Are there any measures in place to keep a deficient registrar out of DNS? Or will NetNames still be serving up records with a promise to do better? [Naively, I thought the DNS hacks were

Re: [cryptography] After the dust settles -- what happens next? (v. Long)

2011-09-11 Thread Paul Hoffman
On Sep 11, 2011, at 4:50 PM, Ian G wrote: So, what happens now? As we all observe, there are two approaches to dealing with the collapse of faith of the PKI system: incremental fixes, and complete rewrite. We don't all observe that. Some of us observe a third, more likely approach:

Re: [cryptography] After the dust settles -- what happens next? (v. Long)

2011-09-11 Thread Marsh Ray
On 09/11/2011 07:26 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: Some of us observe a third, more likely approach: nothing significant happens due to this event. The collapse of faith is only among the security folks whose faith was never there in the first place. A week after the event, who was talking about it

Re: [cryptography] After the dust settles -- what happens next? (v. Long)

2011-09-11 Thread James A. Donald
On 2011-09-12 9:50 AM, Ian G wrote: Google has one more notable advantage: it is the only player with all interests aligned. ... google is already the third person, because it also serves the ad. It knows the merchant. So the next thing that is going to happen is google will serve up the ad

Re: [cryptography] After the dust settles -- what happens next? (v. Long)

2011-09-11 Thread Paul Hoffman
On Sep 11, 2011, at 6:40 PM, Marsh Ray wrote: On 09/11/2011 07:26 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: Some of us observe a third, more likely approach: nothing significant happens due to this event. The collapse of faith is only among the security folks whose faith was never there in the first place. A