[cryptography] project cost of HSMs

2012-04-10 Thread ianG
Does anyone have any estimates for the project cost of employing HSMs at a single task? (e.g., protecting / deploying a single secret, not a network of them.) I'm not looking for sticker prices but project costings, including: spare devices, programming, work-throughs and transfers,

[cryptography] SHA1 extension limitations (Re: Doubts over necessity of SHA-3 cryptography standard)

2012-04-10 Thread Adam Back
Well the length extension is not fully flexible. ie you get SHA1( msg ) which translates into msg-blocks || pad msg-length which is then fed to SHA1-transform, and the IV is some magic values. So the length extension is if you start with a hash that presumably you dont know all the msg-blocks.

Re: [cryptography] project cost of HSMs

2012-04-10 Thread Von Welch
Ian, I've led or been involved with several projects in academia that have used HSMs as a basis for a CA. I can't say I've done a cost analysis at the level of granularity you seem to be looking for, but I will say that at a high-level, the added personnel costs of integrating and maintaining

Re: [cryptography] Doubts over necessity of SHA-3 cryptography standard

2012-04-10 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
But as SHA-2 is still a pure Merkle–Damgård construction it deviates from an ideal pseudorandom function or random oracle in a couple of ways. Firstly, and most significantly, it is subject to length extension attacks. This means that given a hash value of some secret message, we can

[cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Randall Webmail
Cop tools easily bypass 4-digit passcodes By John Leyden • Get more from this author Posted in Enterprise Security, 10th April 2012 08:22 GMT Analysis Forensic tools against smartphones allow basic 4-digit phone passcodes to be bypassed in minutes. However, more complex passcodes are far

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Jon Callas
On Apr 10, 2012, at 10:32 AM, Natanael wrote: Just FYI, there's been claims that these guys faked it. But on the other hand, there ARE other tools that can extract data from iPhones so you can bruteforce the encryption later. I'm pretty certain they faked it. The question is how they

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Andrew R. Whalley
Hello, If you're selling a forensic toolkit, it is not untrue that you could do it in a few minutes on average. It's not what I'd call responsible, though I'd be inclined to agree with Jon's analysis, as have others: The “two minutes” it takes to crack your passcode will only hold true if

Re: [cryptography] Looking for an unusual AKE protocol

2012-04-10 Thread Steven Bellovin
The station-to-station protocol -- a digitally-signed Diffie-Hellman exchange -- should do what you want. On Apr 10, 2012, at 7:59 PM, King Of Fun wrote: I am looking for a protocol that will provide mutual authentication and key exchange with a minor twist: the client and server have RSA

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread ianG
Not wishing to comment on PIN cracking, but here is some evidence that the BYOD phenomena and iPhones are starting to get serious attention: http://dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf (We should look for an NSA equiv, I recall their hardening guide for Mac OSX was far more

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Randall Webmail rv...@insightbb.com wrote: Cop tools easily bypass 4-digit passcodes By John Leyden • Get more from this author Posted in Enterprise Security, 10th April 2012 08:22 GMT Analysis Forensic tools against smartphones allow basic 4-digit phone

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 2:36 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote: On Apr 10, 2012, at 10:32 AM, Natanael wrote: Just FYI, there's been claims that these guys faked it. But on the other hand, there ARE other tools that can extract data from iPhones so you can bruteforce the encryption later.

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

2012-04-10 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 8:50 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: Not wishing to comment on PIN cracking, but here is some evidence that the BYOD phenomena and iPhones are starting to get serious attention: http://dsd.gov.au/publications/iOS5_Hardening_Guide.pdf (We should look for an NSA equiv, I

Re: [cryptography] MS PPTP MPPE only as secure as *single* DES

2012-04-10 Thread ianG
On 9/04/12 13:33 PM, James A. Donald wrote: On 2012-04-09 10:17 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote: I'd put most of it down to conflicting agendas -- even people you regard as evil don't see themselves that way; they simply have a different definition -- agenda -- for good. An agenda which requires