Re: [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution

2014-06-01 Thread grarpamp
In May 2014 someone wrote: p2p is no panacea, it doesn't scale I believe it could. Even if requiring super aggregating nodes of some sort. Layers of service of the whole DHT space. More research is surely required. It is not possible to have fast p2p unless: - Cable networks collaborate

Re: [cryptography] [p2p-hackers] The next gen P2P secure email solution

2014-06-01 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 01/06/14 19:30, grarpamp wrote: It would be nice to check some numbers on this for the list. Is there a wiki or paper repository that discusses plausibly reachable DHT sizes, time needed for DHT ops to resolve, and management schemes for such

Re: [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution

2014-06-01 Thread grarpamp
On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 6:01 AM, tpb-cry...@laposte.net wrote: pesky to/from/subject/etc headers. Those are hidden by use of TLS. weaknesses intrinsic to SMTP discussions? Yes, they are hidden in TLS transport on the wire. No, they are not hidden in core or on disk at the intermediate

Re: [cryptography] [p2p-hackers] The next gen P2P secure email solution

2014-06-01 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 01/06/14 20:54, pira...@gmail.com wrote: There is no way to hide metadata because you need a destination for your messages to arrive ... has to find its destinations to deliver its contents. Yes of course... the minimum necessary for

Re: [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution

2014-06-01 Thread tpb-crypto
I think frivolous stuff could wait some more ... but you can always bundle several connections by means of bonding interfaces. I know it is not the best approach, but let's suppose you need to command a robot or conduct a surgery over p2p. Bonding a few openvpn connections together would do