Re: [cryptography] IETF Working Group Charter on Common Interface to Cryptographic Modules (CICM)

2011-06-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com writes: Right, so one of the lessons learned here was that if IETF had considered APIs and not just protocols those bugs in TLS would have been found long ago. A pen-tester I know once found a (fairly serious) security hole under the influence of (equally

Re: [cryptography] Repeated Encryptions Considered.... ?

2011-06-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ian G i...@iang.org writes: The typical reasons for not using TLS would be [...] (c) it only delivers a relatively small subset of a fuller security model. That's a legitimate reason for using JS crypto. What TLS gives you is the archetypal armoured car from the guy who lives on a cardboard

Re: [cryptography] IETF Working Group Charter on Common Interface to Cryptographic Modules (CICM)

2011-06-22 Thread Marsh Ray
On 06/22/2011 07:17 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: Crypto API designed by an individual or a single organisation: CryptoAPI: A handful of guys at Microsoft I always kind of thought this one looked like someone went a little wild with the UML modeling tools. PKCS #11: Someone at RSA (I've heard

[cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Steven Bellovin
http://www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/application-security/231000129/malware-increasingly-being-signed-with-stolen-certificates.html Not surprising to most readers of this list, I suspect... --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Marsh Ray
On 06/22/2011 10:04 AM, Marsh Ray wrote: Code signing. Occasionally useful. I meant to add: It's usually more useful as a means for an platform vendor to enforce its policies on legitimate developers than as something which delivers increased security to actual systems. - Marsh

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com writes: On 06/22/2011 09:40 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote: http://www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/application-security/231000129/malware-increasingly-being-signed-with-stolen-certificates.html Not surprising to most readers of this list, I

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com writes: It's usually more useful as a means for an platform vendor to enforce its policies on legitimate developers than as something which delivers increased security to actual systems. Symbian being a prime example. With Android it's easier, you just publish

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Arshad Noor
On 06/22/2011 08:04 AM, Marsh Ray wrote: On 06/22/2011 09:40 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote: http://www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/application-security/231000129/malware-increasingly-being-signed-with-stolen-certificates.html Not surprising to most readers of this list, I

Re: [cryptography] IETF Working Group Charter on Common Interface to Cryptographic Modules (CICM)

2011-06-22 Thread Nico Williams
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 7:17 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com writes: Right, so one of the lessons learned here was that if IETF had considered APIs and not just protocols those bugs in TLS would have been found long ago. A pen-tester I know

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Steven Bellovin
Just to split hairs, malware has stolen signing keys for years, but it's only in the last few years that malware vendors have started using them. Maybe that's it -- it's DRM for the malware vendors, to ensure that other bad guys don't steal their code... --Steve Bellovin,

Re: [cryptography] Digitally-signed malware

2011-06-22 Thread Tom Ritter
What happens if the bad guy just strips the signature? What are the circumstances under which an OS or user+OS will refuse to run code that just isn't signed at all? In the case of Microsoft Clickonce, the Install Dialog is changed from Publisher: Discount Bob's Software Hanggliding to

[cryptography] 17% smaller DES S-box circuits: 44.125 and 32.875 gates per S-box

2011-06-22 Thread Solar Designer
Hi, We've just released those, as part of John the Ripper 1.7.8, but freely licensed for reuse anywhere else. Our understanding is that S-box expressions themselves are mathematical formulas and thus are not subject to copyright. The specific code implementing them is licensed under a heavily