The two Ian G's have it correct: while OTR provides (some level of) lack of
evidence within the system, it says nothing about external evidence like
netflow records, which machine the logs were taken from, etc. To pick one bad
example -- bad because I don't know if it fits the facts of this cas
[I'm not usually on this list, but was pointed to this thread. Warning
that we now have two "iang"s on here. ;-) ]
This is a common confusion about OTR. OTR aims to provide the same
deniability as plaintext, while also providing the same authentication
as, say, PGP. You want assurance that the
On 14/07/11 12:37 PM, Ai Weiwei wrote:
Hello list,
Recently, Wired published material on their website which are claimed to be
logs of instant message conversations between Bradley Manning and Adrian Lamo
in that infamous case. [1] I have only casually skimmed them, but did notice
the followi
Good day,
> This like designing a bicycle with three and half wheels. Any
> restructuring that makes DNSSEC useful would make the CAs useless. The
> goal of their design is not to make DNSSEC useful, but to make it useful
> in a fashion that does not harm the CA business model.
With one notable
