As I recall people were calling the PGP ADK feature corporate access to
keys, which the worry was, was only policy + config away from government
access to keys.
I guess the sentiment still stands, and with some justification, people are
still worried about law enforcement access mechanisms for
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Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org writes:
Not sure that we lost the crypto wars. US companies export full strength
crypto these days, and neither the US nor most other western counties have
mandatory GAK. Seems like a win to me :)
Nope. If we had
On Fri, Mar 30, 2012 at 7:10 AM, StealthMonger
stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net wrote:
Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org writes:
Not sure that we lost the crypto wars. US companies export full strength
crypto these days, and neither the US nor most other western counties have
mandatory GAK. Seems
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Nope. If we had won, crypto would be in widespread use today for
email. As it is, enough FUD and confusion was sown to avert that
outcome. Even on geek mailing lists such as this, signatures are
rare.
Sorry, I beg to differ. The average folks
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
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On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 5:18 AM, Darren J
Hi Guys,
I'm aware of two standards where folks fiddled with a scheme and
destroyed its security properties:
* A5/3 based on Kasumi used in GSM networks
* EAX' (EAX Prime) based on EAX mode
Are there any other spectacular failures that come to mind?
Jeff
On 2012 Mar 31, at 11:14 , Jeffrey Walton wrote:
I'm aware of two standards where folks fiddled with a scheme and
destroyed its security properties:
* A5/3 based on Kasumi used in GSM networks
* EAX' (EAX Prime) based on EAX mode
Are there any other spectacular failures that come to
On 31/03/12 03:00 AM, Jeffrey I. Schiller wrote:
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Nope. If we had won, crypto would be in widespread use today for
email. As it is, enough FUD and confusion was sown to avert that
outcome. Even on geek mailing lists such as this, signatures are
From: ianG i...@iang.org
Sorry, I beg to differ. The average folks in the world today never
heard of the crypto war and certainly were not influenced by it.
A bit like saying that the average iPhone user never heard of GSM and
was certainly not influenced in it :)
I have an iPhone.
I don't
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Does anyone have any knowledge of academic papers focused on methods
of detecting whether a crypto scheme has been compromised in situ or
on how to utilize intelligence gleaned from compromised cipher texts
without giving away that compromise to the
On 31/03/12 11:14 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
Hi Guys,
I'm aware of two standards where folks fiddled with a scheme and
destroyed its security properties:
* A5/3 based on Kasumi used in GSM networks
* EAX' (EAX Prime) based on EAX mode
Are there any other spectacular failures that come to mind?
On 31/03/12 13:23 PM, Landon Hurley wrote:
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Does anyone have any knowledge of academic papers focused on methods
of detecting whether a crypto scheme has been compromised in situ or
on how to utilize intelligence gleaned from compromised cipher
On 2012-03-31 1:51 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
We don't encrypt e-mail for other reasons, namely because key
management for e-mail is hard.
Key management is hard because it involves a third party, which third
party is also the major security hole.
We have been doing key management the wrong
On 2012-03-30 10:10 PM, StealthMonger wrote:
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Adam Backa...@cypherspace.org writes:
Not sure that we lost the crypto wars. US companies export full
strength
crypto these days, and neither the US nor most other western
counties have
I'm thinking in terms of scenarios like how could the Nazis have
methodologically shown Enigma's compromise in a systematic manner; the
converse as well though: has there been research into scenarios
similar to the Allies and Enigma (i.e. how to not give the game away),
or has it all just
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James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
On 2012-03-31 1:51 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
We don't encrypt e-mail for other reasons, namely because key
management for e-mail is hard.
Key management is hard because it involves a third party,
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