Am 31.03.2012 04:23, schrieb Landon Hurley:
Does anyone have any knowledge of academic papers focused on
methods of detecting whether a crypto scheme has been compromised
in situ or on how to utilize intelligence gleaned from compromised
cipher texts without giving away that compromise to the
On 3/04/12 05:16 AM, lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
...
Good observations and calculations. So, let's say you wanted a
botnet to do mining. What could you do to improve that?
Get a bigger network! Targeting gamers would also help, given their
hardware.
Hmmm... you're thinking
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ianG i...@iang.org writes:
The crypto wars were about opening up that battlefield so that open
source could start to experiment with lots and lots of alternatives.
The reason we lost the war was because we thought we'd won it. We were
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:35 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
...
To tip my hand here somewhat I'm thinking of GCM.
(Digression.) Now, this thread was useful to me because I started reading
up on new modes and so forth, and combined that with my past experiences.
What I wanted was a fast AES
-Original Message-
From: coderman [mailto:coder...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 15:23
To: Wyss, Felix
Cc: ianG; cryptography@randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Combined cipher modes
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Wyss, Felix felix.w...@inin.com wrote:
...
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 4:10 PM, Wyss, Felix felix.w...@inin.com wrote:
-Original Message-
From: coderman [mailto:coder...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 15:23
To: Wyss, Felix
Cc: ianG; cryptography@randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Combined cipher modes
On Tue,
On 2012-04-03 11:25 PM, StealthMonger wrote:
It's world-class protracted social engineering. Orchestrated by whom?
You attribute too much competence to our enemies. The problem is that
our tools are unsatisfactory, no one wants to use them. They need
improvement.
One tool that works and
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Wyss, Felix felix.w...@inin.com wrote:
...
Maybe being conservative is warranted:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/Ferguson2.pdf
don't use GCM wrong? short tags are bad. changing tag lengths are
bad. use 128bit tags.
If
