Related:
https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/abstracts/ssl-client-bugs.html
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 10:26 PM,
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 08:56:29PM +0100, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
One
Does anyone know why they all do this?
Hi. I'm was a member of the working group that developed DKIM.
The problem is set and forget software. DKIM is a descendant of
Yahoo's DomainKeys, which was developed in about 2005. DKIM is
sufficiently upward compatible with DK that most DK key records
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 07:57:54PM -0400, Matthew Green wrote:
That's my impression.
Others have pointed out that 512 bits is a limit imposed by DNS/UDP text
record sizes (much more and you need TCP). I don't know if that's
accurate and I'm not sure it contradicts my first answer.
DNS
Zack Weinberg zack.weinb...@sv.cmu.edu writes:
Or perhaps the mere presence of a DKIM record is sufficient deterrent against
spam with forged From addresses at a particular domain, and that's the only
thing these organizations thought DKIM was good for.
I think it's more likely that DKIM is
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:34 PM,
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
I want to find common improper usages of OpenSSL library for SSL/TLS.
Can be reverse-engineered from a how to properly use OpenSSL FAQ,
probably, but would prefer information to the first point rather than
its
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
As someone who is one of the DKIM authors, I can but roll my eyes and shrug.
It's an interesting, intentional facet of DKIM that any given key being used
only has to last as long as it takes the email to go from the sender's domain
to the
On 25/10/12 14:34 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Zack Weinberg zack.weinb...@sv.cmu.edu writes:
Or perhaps the mere presence of a DKIM record is sufficient deterrent against
spam with forged From addresses at a particular domain, and that's the only
thing these organizations thought DKIM was good
