On 6/22/13 8:24 PM, Greg Rose wrote:
On Jun 22, 2013, at 15:31 , James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
On 2013-06-23 6:47 AM, Peter Maxwell wrote:
I think Bernstein's Salsa20 is faster and significantly more secure than RC4,
whether you'll be able to design hardware to run at line-speed
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 03:23:01AM -0400, William Allen Simpson wrote:
On 6/22/13 8:24 PM, Greg Rose wrote:
On Jun 22, 2013, at 15:31 , James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
On 2013-06-23 6:47 AM, Peter Maxwell wrote:
I think Bernstein's Salsa20 is faster and significantly more secure
William Allen Simpson william.allen.simp...@gmail.com wrote:
A quick question: what are our current options for 100 Gbps
line rate encryption?
Are we still using variants of ARC4?
The European Union's Estream contest gave two small
portfolios of ciphers, four for software implementation
and
The use of RC4 should be avoided even with the drop-N due to biases that occur
later in the key stream. You should also be extremely careful about mixing IVs
with the key. At a minimum you ought to use a modern cryptographic hash
function -- there's no evidence that repeating key setup is
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017)
qANQR1DDDQQJAwIXvi8KsWclFpDScQE+4jMr/vUA6S04zV34wNYWizM9us1RAST3
sBEzlFcdRswogIGk52rTgpSi1gPQiOOcHWLWxmbf4NENBkiW1SEtv1qEAG87L+Ir
kLJbnxerzrQiRNbH06h6EwNzNDMvL8/yjFdHaaf5P/JSR7JvHDys
=C7n+
-END PGP MESSAGE-
Cool message bro
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 10:27 AM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote:
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017)
qANQR1DDDQQJAwIXvi8KsWclFpDScQ**E+4jMr/**vUA6S04zV34wNYWizM9us1RAST3
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 10:27 AM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote:
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
...
-END PGP MESSAGE-
you know you can use openssl for symmetric encryption, right John?
;)
[NSA can neither confirm nor deny it received your message...]
On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 5:04 AM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
...
in short:
rather than considering just one or another type of attack, these
agencies should be assumed to be using all of them with the exploit
method tailored to the particular access needs and target difficulty
of
http://cryptome.org/2013/07/bletchley-cyberwar-ethics.htm
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
