i'm looking for information on the design and implementation of replay
windows in various protocols.
what concerns drive an appropriate window size?
what role do timestamps play, if any, in constraining replay outside
the active window?
are there persistence requirements for properly maintaining
On 2013-09-26, at 1:49 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Reuse of pads is also disastrous - VENONA made […]
Forgive me for taking this opportunity to repeat an earlier rant, but your
example provides the perfect example.
When a one time pad is operated perfectly, it provides perfect secrecy; but
on
Let me just mention that this conversation is AWESOME. I only wish the folks
over at Perry's Crypto List (http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/)
knew that we were having such a great conversation over here.
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 09:20:04PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
>
> The key reuse
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On 26/09/13 17:36, Sandy Harris wrote:
> John Young wrote:
>
>> Tiltman vaunts the One Time Pad but cautions there have been
>> effective decrypts exploiting enthusiastic sloppy thinking that
>> OTP is unbreakable. Most appears to involve non-deciphe
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 02:23:11PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>
> Moti Young and others wrote a book back in the 90's (or perhaps) 80's,
> that detailed the strength of various RSA key lengths over time. I am
> too lazy to look up the reference or locate the book on my bookshelf.
> Moti: help me out
John Young wrote:
> Tiltman vaunts the One Time Pad but cautions there have been effective
> decrypts exploiting enthusiastic sloppy thinking that OTP is unbreakable.
> Most appears to involve non-decipher means and methods. The paper
> redacts others presumably still effective.
Here's one, not
Wolfram's book is about CAs and not chaos/fractals in general.
For an initial intro you might try "Chaos and Fractals - New Frontiers of
Science" by Hans-Otto Peitgen, Rudolph Dietmar, Saupe, Heinz-Otto, Hartmut
Juergens. You'll also want to get all their other books. Your first read should
al
"Cryptanalystis make their living out of sloppy thinking and enthusiastic
over-ingenuity of designers of cipher systems."
Brig. Gen. J.H. Tiltman, "Some Principles of Cryptographic Security,"
NSA Technical Journal, Summer 1974.
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/Some_Principles.
On 09/22/2013 10:23 PM, coderman wrote:
if you're looking for general research in complexity / chaos, shortcut
to perusing:
Santa Fe Instutute series[0] then AKNOS[1]
from there you'll be able to traverse the myraid particulars of interest...
best regards,
0. "Santa Fe Institute Series"
At 09:16 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote:
Fundamentally, what you're asking for doesn't make sense.
Threat models are about economics, scale, and mistakes,
and even if we don't have security bugs, we still have economics.
An NSA technical report says a unit was set up in Bell Laboratories
over 50 year
> -Original Message-
> From: cryptography [mailto:cryptography-boun...@randombit.net] On
> Behalf Of coderman
> Sent: donderdag 26 september 2013 10:07
> To: ianG
> Cc: Crypto discussion list
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Opinions on Internet Privacy
>
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 12:06 AM, i
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:19 PM, coderman wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
>> ...
>> What threat are you trying to prevent that isn't already solved by the use
>> of cryptography alone?
>
>
> this is some funny shit right here... LOL
someone pointed out that i mig
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 12:06 AM, ianG wrote:
> http://xkcd.com/1269/
finally, a succinct response to the Internet debacle!
did anyone else immediately associate various friends and/or
associates which each archetype?
... i'm craving strawberries.
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On 26/09/13 03:41 AM, John Young wrote:
A sends: "Snowden walked away with the U.S. IC Intellipedia."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia
"What we're after here is 'decision superiority', not 'information
superiority'," he said. "We have to get inside the decision cycle of the
enemy. W
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