On 26 December 2013 19:56, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 02:53:06PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Aaron Toponce
> wrote:
> > BBS is not practical in practice due to the size of the moduli
> > required. You could probably go outside, take an at
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 06:18:47PM -0300, andrew cooke wrote:
> you don't have to reverse it (unless i am confused)! that's the beauty of a
> stream cipher. encryption and decryption are the same, except you remove the
> random stream instead of adding it.
Ah, yes. I'm not thinking clearly. I wa
depends on how the algo designed to be used in a crypto system -- usually
but not always :
- simple exhaustive attacks studied , see if its even worth it to get more
serious , OR , is it in the criteria of the "process" to continue that path
and trim down the cost by increasing the positive chances
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 02:04:29PM -0700, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 05:57:11PM -0300, andrew cooke wrote:
> > here's my suggestion on a possibly harder version.
> >
> > first, remove the complicated edge rules. instead, imagine that the
> > board repeats. so something leavin
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 05:57:11PM -0300, andrew cooke wrote:
> here's my suggestion on a possibly harder version.
>
> first, remove the complicated edge rules. instead, imagine that the
> board repeats. so something leaving nort from h4 will arrive at a7.
> this might help remove biases from th
here's my suggestion on a possibly harder version.
first, remove the complicated edge rules. instead, imagine that the board
repeats. so something leaving nort from h4 will arrive at a7. this might
help remove biases from the corners (where you can be stuck for one move).
the drawback is that
Maybe it's just me, but the "soup to nuts" cryptanalysis process is
black magic. So I am curious...does one start with side channel
attacks? Which attacks are tried on an algorithm first and how is that
decided?
--
Kevin
___
cryptography mailing l
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 02:53:06PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Aaron Toponce
> wrote:
> BBS is not practical in practice due to the size of the moduli
> required. You could probably go outside, take an atmospheric reading,
> and then run it through sha1 quicker
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> ... I've thought of incorporating
> Blum Blum Shub into the algorithm, but then the cipher is getting decidedly
> difficult to execute by hand.
BBS is not practical in practice due to the size of the moduli
required. You could probably go out
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 04:28:06PM -0300, andrew cooke wrote:
> the way that you use the plaintext to avoid short cycles (the "output
> number" etc) is worrying - it might open you up to a chosen plaintext
> attack in some way.
>
> and thinking about chosen plaintexts - if you encode a message tha
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 04:30:31PM -0300, Andrew Cooke wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 04:28:06PM -0300, Andrew Cooke wrote:
> >
> > the way that you use the plaintext to avoid short cycles (the "output
> > number"
> > etc) is worrying - it might open you up to a chosen plaintext attack in some
On 12/26/2013 2:28 PM, andrew cooke wrote:
the way that you use the plaintext to avoid short cycles (the "output number"
etc) is worrying - it might open you up to a chosen plaintext attack in some
way.
and thinking about chosen plaintexts - if you encode a message that is all
zeroes, what does
On 12/26/2013 2:05 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
I created a new hand cipher over the past few weeks, and announced it on my
blog yesterday. I'm curious what people on this list think.
https://pthree.org/2013/12/25/the-drunken-bishop-cipher/
The idea comes from taking an 8x8 chessboard, and ass
On Thu, Dec 26, 2013 at 04:28:06PM -0300, Andrew Cooke wrote:
>
> the way that you use the plaintext to avoid short cycles (the "output number"
> etc) is worrying - it might open you up to a chosen plaintext attack in some
> way.
replying to myself, sorry (but at least not top-posting this time)
the way that you use the plaintext to avoid short cycles (the "output number"
etc) is worrying - it might open you up to a chosen plaintext attack in some
way.
and thinking about chosen plaintexts - if you encode a message that is all
zeroes, what does that reveal? it seems like it might leak in
I created a new hand cipher over the past few weeks, and announced it on my
blog yesterday. I'm curious what people on this list think.
https://pthree.org/2013/12/25/the-drunken-bishop-cipher/
The idea comes from taking an 8x8 chessboard, and assigning the values
0-63 randomly and uniquely to
Hi Garpamp and Adrelanos,
I agree with you too!.. as I am not affiliated with BitMail, .. all that is
needed, you request. It seems to be a model like waste.sf.net out as a
reference. The difference maybe is, I tried to evalute it, and we could
share experience. Anyway.., it is definately a p2p em
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