Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread ianG
On 7/01/14 04:34 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: give users a choice: a generic safe config (disable null, export ciphers, short keys, known-weak, etc), a maximum-interoperability config (3DES and others), and a super- paranoid config (AES-GCM-256, Curve25519, etc), with warnings that that's going to

Re: [cryptography] NSA co-chair claimed sabotage on CFRG list/group (was Re: ECC patent FUD revisited

2014-01-07 Thread ianG
I think, like James, I see the sacrificial lamb approach. There is benefit in watching what they are up to. If a measurable push comes out of the IAB's CFRG, then this is a clear signal to avoid that like the plague. Pushing ECC patents. Pushing NIST curves. Clear signals! Without those

Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread L. Aaron Kaplan
On Jan 7, 2014, at 2:34 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: L. Aaron Kaplan kap...@cert.at writes: As a general observation, it also promotes the thinking that all we need to do is choose magic algorithm A instead of magic algorithm B and everything is fixed. No, if we

Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread L. Aaron Kaplan
On Jan 7, 2014, at 11:24 AM, stef s...@ctrlc.hu wrote: On Tue, Jan 07, 2014 at 11:18:45AM +0100, L. Aaron Kaplan wrote: 1. We will have three config options: cipher String A,B,C ( generic safe config, maximum interoperability (== this also makes the mozilla people happy then) and finally

[cryptography] another Certicom patent

2014-01-07 Thread D. J. Bernstein
Dan Brown writes, on the semi-moderated c...@irtf.org list: I agree with your multiple PK algs suggestion, for parties who can afford it. What about sym key algs? Maybe too costly for now? By the way, this kind of idea goes back at least as far as 1999 from Johnson and Vanstone under the name

Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread ianG
On 7/01/14 13:18 PM, L. Aaron Kaplan wrote: None if this is perfect yet of course. One of the very productive feedback results was that we should make a HTML version. A wiki... I would say. 1. We will have three config options: cipher String A,B,C ( generic safe config, maximum

Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread stef
On Tue, Jan 07, 2014 at 11:39:42AM +0100, L. Aaron Kaplan wrote: On Jan 7, 2014, at 11:24 AM, stef s...@ctrlc.hu wrote: On Tue, Jan 07, 2014 at 11:18:45AM +0100, L. Aaron Kaplan wrote: 1. We will have three config options: cipher String A,B,C ( generic safe config, maximum

Re: [cryptography] [Ach] Better Crypto

2014-01-07 Thread Aaron Zauner
Hi, * Axel Hübl wrote: I could not agree more. Crazy C get's totally against the scope of this document: providing _relyable_ crypto. If someone reads that document and goes for see, they still list it as compatible, provide it! the document lost it's main point. I agree too. Sorry. But

[cryptography] NSA, FBI creep rule of law, democracy itself (Re: To Protect and Infect Slides)

2014-01-07 Thread Adam Back
This is indeed an interesting and scary question: On Sun, Jan 05, 2014 at 08:31:42PM +0300, ianG wrote: What is a game changer is the relationship between the NSA and the other USA civilian agencies. The breach of the civil/military line is the one thing that has sent the fear level rocketing

Re: [cryptography] NSA, FBI creep rule of law, democracy itself (Re: To Protect and Infect Slides)

2014-01-07 Thread Jeffrey Walton
(Sorry to top post - I want to cherry pick one point). What is a game changer is the relationship between the NSA and the other USA civilian agencies. The breach of the civil/military line is the one thing that has sent the fear level rocketing sky high, Information sharing among agencies