Re: [cryptography] This is bad. THis is really bad. (Isn't it?)

fear not, mikey d is on it: http://en.community.dell.com/dell-blogs/direct2dell/b/direct2dell/archive/2015/11/23/response-to-concerns-regarding-edellroot-certificate due diligence aside, wats with dell and pfx files? https://support.software.dell.com/sonicwall-email-security/kb/sw10754 On Nov

Re: [cryptography] This is bad. THis is really bad. (Isn't it?)

On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 9:16 AM, Dave Howe wrote: > On 25/11/2015 12:59, Florian Schütz wrote: >> This is true for Chrome and, I think, for Firefox as well. Some >> enterprises insist on MITMing TLS connections at a proxy, and at least >> Chrome will not break this.

Re: [cryptography] This is bad. THis is really bad. (Isn't it?)

On 23/11/2015 22:33, rv...@insightbb.com wrote: > UPDATE: I've been reading that a lot of people are skeptical in the > sense that this CA can't actually do anything because the CA has no > capabilities. I did some more research and found out that this CA can > indeed sign server certificates.

Re: [cryptography] This is bad. THis is really bad. (Isn't it?)

On 25/11/2015 12:59, Florian Schütz wrote: > This is true for Chrome and, I think, for Firefox as well. Some > enterprises insist on MITMing TLS connections at a proxy, and at least > Chrome will not break this. They argue if they were to strictly > enforce Pins, people would just switch to a more