Most of the Cryptologs were formerly classified Top Secret.
NSA calls it a monumental release.
Non-searchable image files at NSA:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/cryptologs.shtml
The full collection in a Zipped file:
http://www.governmentattic.org/7docs/NSA-Cryptolog_1997-1974.pdf
NSA website seems overloaded. Mirror and index of declassified
NSA Cryptologs 1974-1997:
http://cryptome.org/2013/03/cryptologs/00-cryptolog-index.htmhttp://cryptome.org/2013/03/cryptologs/00-cryptolog-index.htm
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A person notes that NSA has replaced the imaged non-searchable PDF
Cryptologs with searchable PDF versions. Much more useful. Still lacking
a comprehensive index but that can now be compiled from the new PDFs.
Same URL:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/cryptologs.shtml
NSA Cryptolog, August-September 1986 reviews Ralph Merkel's
book, Secrecy, Authentication,and Public Key Systems, with disdain
and dismissal:
No library need acquire this tract.
The once Secret review cites the PKC work of James Ellis, Malcolm
Williamson and Cliff Cocks at GCHQ eleven years
http://cryptome.org/2013/05/cybercrime-battle.pdf
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NSA released to Governmentattic.org on May 29, 2013 and then
published on June 24, 2013:
It Wasn't All Magic: The Early Struggle to Automate Cryptanalysis,
1930s-1960s, 362 pages.
Then Slashdotted into overloading the site, which was suspended
by the ISP. A copy:
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) certifies two types of
cryptosystems:
1. Certification system for cryptographic protection of information
(ROSS RU.0001.030001).
2. Certification system for information security requirements for the
safety of information constituting a state secret
The more fiercely defended security system (anything)
the more likely indefensible. Best ones require constant
patching and understatement, without exculpation, apologia
and bullying arrogance of ignorance.
But cloying humility, obsequiousness and masochism
seduces sadists for backdooring STD.
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017)
qANQR1DDDQQJAwIXvi8KsWclFpDScQE+4jMr/vUA6S04zV34wNYWizM9us1RAST3
sBEzlFcdRswogIGk52rTgpSi1gPQiOOcHWLWxmbf4NENBkiW1SEtv1qEAG87L+Ir
kLJbnxerzrQiRNbH06h6EwNzNDMvL8/yjFdHaaf5P/JSR7JvHDys
=C7n+
-END PGP MESSAGE-
http://cryptome.org/2013/07/bletchley-cyberwar-ethics.htm
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http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nist-fips-186-4.htm
The standard:
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
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NSA released on 23 July 2013 The History of Traffic Analysis:
World War I-Vietnam.
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/misc/traffic_analysis.pdf
It notes the formation of T/A (Traffic Analysis) and C/A (Cryptanalysis)
as the two elements of code-breaking, using the
Th NSA Traffic Analysis history reduced from 11.5MB to 3.2MB:
http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-traffic-analysis.pdf
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Has subquantum crypto attack been substantiated?
arXiv:quant-ph/0203049v2 12 Apr 2002
Subquantum Information and Computation
Antony Valentini
It is argued that immense physical resources for nonlocal communication,
espionage, and exponentially-fast computation are hidden from us by
There are two spaces labeled Urea Tank Room in the NSA Utah
Data Center's Generator Plant shown in construction drawings
recently leaked:
http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
See Generator Plant floor plan drawing 11.2 A101 at bottom and
top left, spaces labeled UT.
Not much publicly available on the cabling and emanations
protection of the NSA Utah Data Center. Surely highly advanced
measures are being applied.
Google Earth shows a couple of stages of construction, Bing
Maps a couple more. AP has published a dozen or so hi-rez photos
of construction.
A
An engineer formerly working at the National Radio Astronomy
Observatory (http://www.gb.nrao.edu/nrqz/) lists its radiation
emissions controls:
http://cryptome.org/2013/07/radiated-emissions-control.htm
Among them is the banning of vehicles which use spark plugs,
thus diesel-fueled are
Inquiry about emissions at NSA UDC and other data centers
was not for external capture but about internal protection from
its own emanating equipment. In particular EM interference by
the big generators at most of the facilities, electrical sub-stations,
processing racks, cabling, switches,
More specifically inadvertent emissions like Non-Stop,
acoustic, vibratory, olfactory, echo, refractory, extent,
periodicity, amplitude, array, those still loosely or firmly
classified. Those somewhat treated of sea and space
borne vessels by degaussing, presumably more difficult
for aged
http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/news/index.shtml
The theme for the 2013 symposium, to be held on
October 17-18 at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory's Kossiakoff Conference Center (just west
of Laurel, Maryland) is Technological Change and
Cryptology:
http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
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DIY Germicide:
http://prism-break.org
http://lockerproject.org/
https://securityinabox.org/
http://eyebeam.org/research/calls/request-for-proposals-prism-break-up
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Some time ago opinion was that only versions of PGP
beginning with 2 were trustworthy, that is before the add-on
junk for user convenience which opened holes galore,
then much more vuls as it went to global market and use
by governments. Is that still the case?
We have archived versions since
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/08/cyber-offense/
NSA Head: US Cyber Offense Is Best in World
Cyber offense requires a deep, persistent and pervasive
presence on adversary networks in order to precisely deliver
effects, Gen. Alexander explained in response to a question
from Rep. Trent Franks
It should be remembered that most, if not all, the UN members
spy on one another. UN embassies and consulates in NYC bristle
with antenna. The US embassy, a high-rise across from the UN,
overlooks the mother ship and the wee boats huddling close.
It was rebuilt a few years ago to get rid of the
Thanks for this pointer which leads to Schneier's two reports
in the Guardian about cooperating with Greenwald.
As head of BT security it is hard to believe that Schneier did not
know about BT's covert cooperation with GCHQ and NSA.
His NDA with BT would likely prevent disclosing that knowledge
An understated response to the NSA and unidentifed friends treachery:
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html
More of these expected, many. But who knows, as Green says,
all could go back to swell comsec business as usual.
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The document you cited hosted by Techarp is claimed to be
a hoax based on an earlier authentic document from 2012.
A notice about it:
http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013.pdf
However, with recent revelations about NSA some of the
document's assertions may turn to have more truth
Security theater. Phony as thinking NSA and national spies
spy from embassies, not the key internet exchanges and
telecom hubs in Frankfurt and other locations around the globe.
This is amply described in a slew of technical reports and popular
articles and books. Although, tellingly, not much
ProPublica's Jeff Larson on the NSA Crypto Story
http://source.mozillaopennews.org/en-US/articles/propublicas-jeff-larson-nsa-crypto-story/
Describes two months of digging through the Snowden documents, using
search tool Intella, finding code words, looking for references to those,
scrambling
It continues to mystify why Greenwald and others crop and
redact documents and slides but show them to staff at
O Globo, Guardian, Der Spiegel, New York Times, ProPublica,
Washington Post and perhaps others yet to be disclosed
with bombshell releases (now even Clapper is applauding
the Snowden
Nothing more useful for spies than widely trusted cryptosystems.
Nor do they ever reveal cracking the highly reputable. Neither
confirm nor deny. They do leak vulns, participate in standards
settings earnestly and lackadasiacly, fund good and bad research,
buy good and bad systems, hire good and
NSA Technical Journal published in October 1959 an article
titled The Borders of Cryptology.
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/borders_cryptology.pdf
A chart shows three main topics with subdivisions of each:
Electronic Warfare
Cryptology
SIGINT
NSA Technical Journal published The Unbreakable Cipher in Spring 1961.
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/The_Unbreakable_Cipher.pdf
Excerpts:
[Quote]
David Kahn, Lyen Otuu Wllwgh WI Etjown pp. 71, 83, 84, 86,
88 and 90 of the New York Times Magazine November 13, 1960
says
Now that it appears the Internet is compromised what other
means can rapidly deliver tiny fragments of an encrypted
message, each unique for transmission, then reassembled
upon receipt, kind of like packets but much smaller and less
predictable, dare say random?
The legacy transceiver
At 04:36 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote:
What threat are you trying to prevent that isn't already solved
by the use of cryptography alone?
Transceiver vulnerabilities of the Internet, seemingly inherently
insecure by design. So looking for possibilities of moving encrypted
goods by other means not
Yes, along those lines. Free of the totally seductively entrapping
internet and monomanical PK promiscuity.
The slew of innovations to milk the internet and crypto are way
stations toward surpassing vulns of both used in concert. Both
mutually delude. Each might lead to better alone, paired with
At 04:21 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote:
About your only choices are hams or (slightly higher budget)
microsats with onboard flash and DTN (notice you can deliver
packets during flyby). Hams also do launch microsats,
so there's some overlap. I've been waiting for consumer
phased arrays, just saw Locata
A sends: Snowden walked away with the U.S. IC Intellipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia
Information on the validity of this claim invited: cryptome[at]earthlink.net
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At 09:16 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote:
Fundamentally, what you're asking for doesn't make sense.
Threat models are about economics, scale, and mistakes,
and even if we don't have security bugs, we still have economics.
An NSA technical report says a unit was set up in Bell Laboratories
over 50
Cryptanalystis make their living out of sloppy thinking and enthusiastic
over-ingenuity of designers of cipher systems.
Brig. Gen. J.H. Tiltman, Some Principles of Cryptographic Security,
NSA Technical Journal, Summer 1974.
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/Some_Principles.pdf
The Institute for Defense Analyses, based in Alexandria, VA,
is a 50-year partner of NSA. It has two Centers for Communications
Research at Princeton, NJ, and La Jolla, CA, both doing cryptological
research for NSA:
http://www.idaccr.org/
http://www.ccrwest.org/
The latter's web site lists
The several crypto lists run by mailman email passwords monthly.
Open crypto lists are not meant to be more trustworthy than open
crypto.
At 10:28 AM 10/1/2013, you wrote:
This falls somewhere in the land of beyond-the-absurd.
Just got this message from your robot:
On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:00
Steven Bellovin Talk at NSA History Conference today:
Vernam, Mauborgne, Friedman: The One-Time Pad and the Index of Coincidence
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/%7Esmb/talks/VernamMauborgneFriedman.pdfhttps://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/talks/VernamMauborgneFriedman.pdf
Snowden filtered by Janes Risen filtered by New York Times,
as with all other filterings by special-interested Snowden
filters, does deliver a reassuring message to precisely
answer highly filtered questions and charges that have
been made about his heavily filtered, nay, almost negligible
Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, Rahul Sagar:
http://www.amazon.com/Secrets-Leaks-Dilemma-State-Secrecy-ebook/dp/B00F8MIINQ/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-textie=UTF8qid=1382104064sr=1-1keywords=secrets+and+leaks
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Musings on Snowden being devoured, threatened then totemized
like Ellsberg:
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nyt-nsa-papers.htm
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Carlos Slim is my gym client. Despite begging and tipping
bags of pesos, not yet slim. Hung before his exerbike is
Thompson's headshot.
- taking any bets? lng odds ;)
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them. What should they do?
--
http://josephholsten.com
On Oct 18, 2013, at 13:37, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote:
We still don't know, and likely will never know, what is in the
Snowden collection. Admirable as his courage may be, he
erred in handing it over to media incapable of assessing
This is the most interesting post to appear since the list
was re-energized.
The weakest elements of comsec are related to matters
seldom discussed on crypto fora which are heavily biased
toward digital technology. As might be expected on the
Internet and its crippling and perhaps fatal
Wait, numbbutt whiners, there is gold in those duplicates, triplicates.
Eugen's multiple posts are not identical. Best save them all
for the quite valuable and revealing metadata which differs
for each. That metadata's value usually exceeds the stupid
bitchings rancid and senseless as oh so
Unless a billionaire steps up to fund Tor it will be a while before
small contributions can supplant federal funding. It now comes from
DoD through a contractor and from the State Department's principal
propaganda agency, Braodcast Board of Governors, through a
named front, Internews.
Since this
At 12:55 PM 11/8/2013, you wrote:
Snowden persuaded other NSA workers to give up passwords,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/08/net-us-usa-security-snowden-idUSBRE9A703020131108.
The revelation that Snowden got access to some of the material
he leaked by using colleagues' passwords
The Guardian version (greater redaction):
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784159/sigintenabling-clean-1.pdf
NYTimes-ProPublica version (lesser redaction):
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784280/sigint-enabling-project.pdf
[0] A related question is where were these slides posted on
-instituted. Same for eventual dust-binning of digital
crypto in favor of, well, best not to fall for open source
delusion again.
At 11:25 AM 11/10/2013, you wrote:
On 10/11/13 16:31 PM, John Young wrote:
The Guardian version (greater redaction):
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784159/sigintenabling
A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace 1986 to 2012:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00E00QSN4/ref=cm_cr_rev_prod_title
Excerpts:
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/fierce-domain.htm
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Yfeature=c4-overviewlist=UURwhQQfBNzjB-68PlIRRD9w
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The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty well covers all the
comsec and crypto initiatives to covertly exploit people, cryptographers,
anonymizers, informants, planted spies, security firms, networks,
governments, nations, friends, lovers and citizens.
Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests will
Willis Ware dies, early computer engineer:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/02/technology/willis-ware-who-helped-build-blueprint-for-computer-design-dies-at-93.html
Seminal computer security paper 1979:
http://cryptome.org/sccs.htm
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Please stop this suicidal, treacherous discussion. You're undermining
the global industry of weak crypto and comsec. That counts as economic
terrorism in all the countries who abide arms control, export control,
copyright, capitalism, heirarchical rule, suppression of dissent, lawful
spying,
Excellent pointer. Full paper published today, 18 Dec 2013:
RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis, by
Genkin, Shamir, Tromer:
http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf
At 11:29 AM 12/18/2013, you wrote:
http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/
Proceeding with novel comsec investigations, the New Yorker
this week has an article on plant communication and intelligence
and how they differ from those of animals.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/12/23/131223fa_fact_pollan
Plant signaling with chemical emissions was intriguing, as
http://cryptome.org/2013/12/turing-pardon.pdfhttp://cryptome.org/2013/12/turing-pardon.pdf
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Jake's, Assange's and others' emphasis at 30c3 was to pursue
technological offenses rather than futile expectation of political,
financial and legal controls of spying which inevitably confirm
what spies do, for it is in their interest to support spyin and
secrecy to maintain hegemonic,
At 11:01 AM 1/3/2014, you wrote:
Friends,
Given the fact that Levison states:
This experience has taught me one very important lesson: without
congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would
_strongly_ recommend against anyone trusting their private data to a
company with
If your server or ISP generates log files, as all do, you cannot
be secure. If upstream servers generate log files, as all do,
you cannot be secure. If local, regional, national and international
servers generate log files, as all do, you cannot be secure.
So long as log files are ubiquitous on
goes right through that
tiny aperture of access to construct an unbelievable spying
operation, far more insidious than that of the official spies,
which as we know merely copy the industry and buy a small
number of its products.
At 11:42 AM 1/6/2014, Laurens Vets wrote:
On 2014-01-05 01:01, John
Thanks. We posted the Wassenaar changes on Cryptome
on December 19.
http://cryptome.org/2013/12/wassenaar-intrusion.htm
http://cryptome.org/2013/12/wassenaar-list-13-1204.pdf
The intrusion software has received some but not sufficient
attention. And beyond the sections you cite there are many
Pierre Omidyar's Business Model for First Look is Like a Second Life
or Anti-Virus Guard Scam
http://3dblogger.typepad.com/wired_state/2014/01/pierre-omidyars-business-model-for-first-look-is-like-a-second-life-or-anti-virus-guard-scam.html
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Hector Sabu Monsegur sentencing 2 April 2014:
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/monsegur-13-0113.htm
This is the latest postponement as Sabu continues assisting
authorities sweep up his confederates and other cyber targets.
Also helped by an undentified informant who ratted Sabu.
This has netted
Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, sacrificing a victim purges guilt
of the guilty.
Does anyone really believe RSA is alone in this betrayal?
And that making an example of RSA will stop the industry practice
of forked-tonguedness about working both sides of the imaginary
fence of dual-use,
If courageous, Rivest, Shamir and Adelson can be burnt in effigy.
Their initials once were rightly world famous, and to smear these
distinguished gentlemen by vulgar opportunistic protest instigated
by noobs with less than zero comprehension of cryptography
should be condemned not debated.
But open source is compromised as well, for the same reasons
and by the same parties. Some claim open source was born of and
is powned by the spies. No problema, overcoming compromises
of parentage has forever been the fundamental, albeit futile,
crypto challenge.
Even precious OTP is
With a $67B security market heading to $87B by 2016 why
would any security firm settle for RSA piddling racketerring?
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/technology/upstarts-challenge-old-timers-in-lucrative-computer-security-field.html
Not saying the RSA bashers are diverting attention from
), and you'll arrive at the real shady dealmakers. I know, I was his
neighbor for quite awhile. At the time Jim Bidzos was a fairly unimportant
creature, and Burt Kaliski and Art Corviello weren't even heard of.
-
At 04:57 AM 1/17/2014, you wrote:
On 2014-01-17 01:28, John Young wrote:
Civil
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/guccifer-arrested.htm
Guccifer Archive (~7GB)
http://pastebin.com/ph02cfxw
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Any further information on the alleged NSA-GCHQ attack on
Jean-Jacques Quisquater than these two reports?
http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
Apparently Quisquater would not have known about the
attack if not told by an insider.
Insider comsec disclosures may be finally getting
Good to see the report on Target's penetration through its remote
heating and cooling controls. These and a slew of other building
automation systems are often run on central computers along with
data processing. Data processing may be protected but the other
systems often are not, for IT sec
Building data security from 1995:
http://cryptome.org/datasec.htm
Much changed since then.
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http://cryptome.org/2014/02/quisquater-comments.htm
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http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-drop.pdf (7.6MB)
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Correct, page 13 was missing. Thanks. Now added.
Page begins with his head. But Snowden told her:
Ends with Even with Assange's
At 01:47 AM 2/9/2014, you wrote:
On 9/02/14 02:28 AM, John Young wrote:
http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-drop.pdf (7.6MB)
page 12: After all, coming forward
http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-meet.pdf
Snowden to MacAskill, vehemently: GCHQ is worse than NSA. It's even
more intrusive.
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, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote:
http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-meet.pdf
Snowden to MacAskill, vehemently: GCHQ is worse than NSA. It's
even more intrusive.
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If NSA and GCHQ were, are, doing these alleged operations as surmised
with slightest evidence greatly amplified, cherry-picked and moshed like
a Tom Clancy hot seller, it is likely the Devil's Duo are meticulously
tracking, siphoning and implanting:
1. Those reporting, editing, checking,
Thanks, Ed, comsec evangelist extraordinaire. If the media operation
goes well Snowden could die penniless like the genius Tesla was aced
by profit-driven Edison.
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Snowden may have raised the prospect of comsec as a public utility
like power, water, gas, sewage, air quality, environmental protection
and telecommunications. Privacy protection has been shown to be
illusory at best, deceptive at worst, due to the uncontrollable
technology applied erroneously
At 11:52 PM 3/13/2014, Troy Benjegerdes sigged:
earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul
Your sig: earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul (EWAFMSS)
pretty well covers the area of operations needing ubiquitous comsec
against ubuiquitous spying of EWAFMSS.
Certainly there will be
Snowden's video, comments and talks at SXSW convey the failure
to aim higher with ubiquitous comsec, instead to remain within the
comfortable fold of Snowden's do no harm to national security.
This blind faith in natsec cautionary implantation in Snowden and
his media outlets aided by technical
Journalists Shill Sources and Secrets
http://sourcesandsecrets.com/
Advertised with $20,000 full-page vanity ad in the New York Times, 16
March 2014.
Coordinated with the NYT's release of its Snowden files series and
books by Greenwald and Gellman, and video by Poitras, as well as
At 12:09 AM 3/17/2014, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
If everything (including the network path my data takes) is encrypted,
then I have no real ability to know if it's being tapped, redirected,
or misdirected.
A point not well emphasized by cryptographers, in public at least,
and advocates of
At 09:25 PM 3/16/2014, Cari Machet wrote:
wait ... are you saying money corrupts ???
if you are saying that corruption is at hand then how can we trust
the supposed human beings behind any of these names ? i mean i think
you are saying corruption is at hand but i dont want to assume
Sys admins catch you hunting them and arrange compromises
to fit your demands so you can crow about how skilled you are.
Then you hire them after being duped as you duped to be hired.
The lead Tor designer reportedly (via Washington Post) had a
session with NSA to brief on how to compromise it,
The marriage of flexible legal protections and malleable comsec is a
venerable dynasty of compromise.
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Ubiquitous use of a comsec system is a vulnerability, whether
PGP or Tor or another popular means. Crypto advocates and
Tor encourage widespread use as a defense but may be luring
victims into traps. The more users of a system the more likely
it will be attacked by officials or by malefactors.
Stone's is a good statement which correctly places responsibility
on three-branch policy and oversight of NSA, a military unit obliged
to obey command of civilians however bizarre and politically self-serving.
ODNI and NSA have been inviting a series of critics and journalists
to discussions.
The CIA is the principal customer of NSA products outside
the military. When global cyber spying Cybercom was proposed
NSA did not want to do it, claiming it exceeded NSA's military
mission. However, the pols, and CIA, wanted that very excess,
in particular for spying inside the US, ostensibly
Informative tweets on Tails security since the fund-raising announcement:
http://cryptome.org/2014/04/tails-security.pdf
At 09:09 AM 4/4/2014, you wrote:
Has anyone looked at Tails?
http://www.salon.com/2014/04/02/crucial_encryption_tool_enabled_nsa_reporting_on_shoestring_budget/
Crucial
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