On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 10:02:51AM +0300, ianG wrote:
The big example here is of SSL. In v1 it was vulnerable to MITM,
which was theoretically claimed to make it 'insecure'. In practice
there was no evidence of a threat, and still little real evidence of
that precise threat. Fixing the MITM
On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 05:59:38PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Here, I just don't understand the logic. To me, encrypting without
authenticating buys you absolutely nothing, except to burn CPU cycles
and contribute to global warming. In the *vast* majority of
networking technology we use,
On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 12:25:50PM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
I think it time to deprecate non-https (and non-forward secret
ciphersuites.) Compute power has moved on, session cacheing works,
symmetric crypto is cheap.
A reasonable use for the $3k the OP is talking about would be to add
Have you considered merkle trees for scalability?
Specifically a client can generate a unique 128-bit nonce and have the trusted
server timestamp it by signing a message including the nonce and the current
time T. If the time between the request and the reply was dt, the actual time
must be in
previously hidden away in some government
lab to leak.
- Forwarded message from Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org -
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 02:07:58 -0400
From: Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org
To: Bitcoin Dev bitcoin-developm...@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered
On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 11:06:56AM +0200, Stephen Röttger wrote:
Sorry, for the late reply, I was out of town.
Specifically a client can generate a unique 128-bit nonce and have the
trusted server timestamp it by signing a message including the nonce and
the current time T. If the time
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 02:29:11PM +0200, Natanael wrote:
Should we create some kind of CRL style protocol for algorithms? Then we'd
have a bunch of servers run by various organizations specialized on
crypto/computer security that can issue warnings against unsecure
algorithms, as well as
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 09:31:04AM -0430, Karn Kallio wrote:
The paper Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable may be of
interest.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243
Abstract. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a pub-
lic log called the blockchain. Its
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 10:33:08PM -0500, Bernie Cosell wrote:
So that's not a handy archive. But the first archive you mention is
great -- I didn't know it existed: it should be publicized or something.
I don't know if the RFCs permit it, but could there be a
list-archive:
header?
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 07:43:12PM -0500, Greg wrote:
I'm curious, is Aaron's response representative of the entire list's, or are
there folks out there lurking who would actually appreciate a forum?
Show of hands?
I mostly lurk and I strongly prefer a mailing list solution.
I'm in the
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 11:03:31PM -0500, Benjamin Kreuter wrote:
I mostly lurk and I strongly prefer a mailing list solution.
I'm in the Bitcoin community and we keep on talking about fully
decentralized backends to mailing lists/usenet replacements,
Out of curiosity, where do you see
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 09:39:22PM -0500, Bernie Cosell wrote:
*even*? So it isnt' just like a mailing list at all. Since I replied
to this post by hitting 'r' in my email client... and out it went.
I know PHPbb has gotten a lot fancier, but I still think that it is not
near as
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 09:34:57PM -0500, Greg wrote:
On Dec 24, 2013, at 9:02 PM, StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net
wrote:
Greg g...@kinostudios.com writes:
Also, do you enjoy not being able to edit your comments?
What kind of software do you suppose people are using,
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 11:42:47AM -0800, coderman wrote:
use case is long term (decade+) identity rather than privacy or
session authorization.
eternity key signs working keys tuned for speed with limited secret
life span (month+). working keys are used for secret exchange and any
other
Timelock
Create a secret key that can be decrypted in a known amount of time
using parallel-serial hash chains. The creator can compute the timelock
in parallel, taking advantage of the large amount of cheap parallelism
available today, while others are forced to compute it serially,
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 03:34:33PM -, sten...@nymphet.paranoici.org wrote:
> Zooko Wilcox-OHearn writes:
>
> > https://z.cash ... There's a lot going on there. ... Jump in!
>
> I want to jump in but I can't because z.cash has no mailing list. A
> mailing list is
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