Il giorno sab, 31/03/2012 alle 13.03 +1000, James A. Donald ha scritto:
On 2012-03-31 1:51 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
We don't encrypt e-mail for other reasons, namely because key
management for e-mail is hard.
Key management is hard because it involves a third party, which third
party
On 21/03/13 at 03:07am, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
Linux has not warmed up to the fact that userland needs help in
storing secrets from the OS.
http://standards.freedesktop.org/secret-service/
but maybe I have misunderstood your statement.
___
On 30/06/13 at 07:32pm, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
I'd love to see a revitalisation of remailer research, focussing on
unlinkability (which we know many people would benefit from) rather
than sender anonymity (which fewer people need, and which is prone to
abuse that discourages people from
. But this is completely personal, and each
of us as his/her requirements to satisfy. And, by the way, I am aware
that the most important bug (which can't be corrected) of any systems is
the human who is using it.
With respect,
danimoth
___
cryptography mailing list
On 04/07/13 at 04:28pm, Michael Rogers wrote:
I think the point is that i2p's decision to use a decentralised
directory service led to the vulnerabilities described in the paper.
Uhm, I don't consider it a matter of centralization vs decentralization.
I think the point is how I2P select peers
On 29/08/13 at 03:09pm, Nikos Fotiou wrote:
A suspicious user may wonder, how can he be sure that the service
indeed uses the provided source code. IMHO, end-to-end security can be
really verifiable--from the user perspective--if it can be attested by
examining only the source code of the
On 29/08/13 at 11:54pm, zooko wrote:
The Least-Authority Filesystem does all of the above. We have some pretty good
docs:
https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/docs/about.rst
http://code.google.com/p/nilestore/wiki/TahoeLAFSBasics
On 02/10/13 at 08:51am, Florian Weimer wrote:
There is widespread belief that compressing before encrypting makes
cryptanalysis harder, so compression is assumed to be beneficial.
Any academic references?
Without these, IMHO your sentence is false.
Example: http://breachattack.com/
of talking about metadata, which SMTP
exposes regardless of encryption or authentication. In the design of
this p2p system, should metadata's problem kept in consideration or not?
IMHO exposing danimoth@cryptolab or my key it's the same, as there is
a function between them. I2P and/or Tor adds complexity
On 24/12/13 at 04:20am, grarpamp wrote:
This thread pertains specifically to the use of P2P/DHT models
to replace traditional email as we know it today. There was
a former similarly named thread on this that diverged... from the
concept and challenge of P2P/DHT handling the transport and
10 matches
Mail list logo
