Re: [cryptography] RSA signatures without padding

This paper probably helps answering part of your question : http://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2000/18800229/18800229.pdf Note that you can't replace a random oracle by SHA256 but you might have better luck with HMAC-SHA256 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/382.pdf)

Re: [cryptography] Enranda: 4MB/s Userspace TRNG

forever : you need to be able to reseed it in case of compromise and since you won't necessarily know when the compromise happened it's good practice to reseed from time to time -- Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography

Re: [cryptography] QODE(quick offline data encryption)

The confidence in AES comes from its designation process during which many publicly tried and failed to convincingly reduce its security claim and the fact that it has (publicly still) stood the test of time : ten years later all we have are the bicliques which gains us 2 bits. It doesn't have

Re: [cryptography] Client certificates, Tor-exit nodes and renegotiation

certificate-less client messages). A competent and funded organization might then have a very small pool of users to choose from as to who might be trying to connect a particular server which somewhat defeats the purpose of Tor -- Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako

Re: [cryptography] Privacy Enforced [was: Comsec as Public Utility Beyond Illusory Privacy]

through technical expertise -- Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography