a web page or even putting the text inline
would suffice.
- Taral
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, Z
makes me *less* secure than no BTNS at all.
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I think DANE will help with that. But that's blocked on having enough/easy
DNSSEC-capable registrars.
- Taral
On Jul 2, 2013 3:26 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
I think it time to deprecate non-https (and non-forward secret
ciphersuites.) Compute power has moved on, session
?
A BTNS implementation. There aren't any.
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Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you
which
adds some anonymity.
They also use a weird hash. (First half of sha512.) The only reason I can
think of is they expect computing first half of sha512 is harder than
sha256. With some hard work this could be false.
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 5:40 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote:
Has
, who is in charge of Ripple's
crypto:
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/10220/what-is-the-relationship-between-the-ripple-secret-key-and-the-wallet-name-passp/10224#10224
That's about the payvault/local blob storage system for storing the
secret. Nothing to do with this.
--
Taral tar
persist, so
I'm just not clear on your specific points of confusion.
On Tue, Jun 25, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jun 25, 2013 at 5:08 PM, Clark Minor cla...@mit.edu wrote:
Why use secp256k1 and ripemd160 (I think that's what you mean by odd
hash)? I think the main
these
distribution channels, script injection and tampering is not a high
risk because its part of the application bundle.
Can you mitigate the risk with the Chrome webstore too? Perhaps via
some kind of chain-of-trust or attestation scheme.
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Please let me know if there's any further
On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:56 AM, mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
I hope they kept that recording secret. Anybody can start recording
now and then backdate things like recorded verbal agreements.
I think you underestimate the difficulty of *removing* hum from a recording.
--
Taral
with a reason.
Information about the Google CRLSet format is welcome.
A glance at the code says the dump is of the form:
spki hash
serial
serial
serial
And it looks like it's been updated:
% ./crlset dump crlset | grep '^ ' | wc -l
3809
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Please let me know
available interfaces expose this, however.
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.
Actually, it's pretty easy to create a transaction whose outputs are
obviously unsatisfiable.
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by the
exchange and transfer them to /dev/null.
Sorry. It is not clear that the Mt Gox software would allow the
creation of such a transaction. I was speaking from the protocol
level.
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