Re: [cryptography] the Zcash Open Source Miner Challenge (and about Zcash in general)

2017-07-07 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
> On 7 Jul 2017, at 22:52, Jaromil <jaro...@dyne.org> wrote: > > On Tue, 04 Jul 2017, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > >> this is a good answer, in particular your declaration that you >> "haven't bought or sold any ZEC". I believe you should

Re: [cryptography] the Zcash Open Source Miner Challenge (and about Zcash in general)

2017-07-04 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
> > I'd agree that "forums" are a poor choice. > They're magnets for masses of the clueless, > which is fine for that purpose. They are easy to use, rather than archaic and unappealing. Not sure what kind of argument this is, anyway. > And they're heavyweight, captive, and exploitable. > My

Re: [cryptography] a little help with cookies please

2015-09-16 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
No. Every request has a header with the cookies in it. Again: /every request contains the cookie/ This is also a reason for placing static content on a seperate server; it saves bandwidth by not sending the cookie in the request. ___ cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Possible SigInt Metadata Dump Files Circulating

2015-06-10 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Just to check if I'm getting this correctly: There's an immense amount of sigint data that's (being) leaked into public infrastructure - and wilf...@vt.edu is telling us about it? Can we access this data **? How is Wilfred knowing of this, and allowed to speak of it? Why not speak of the

Re: [cryptography] Weak random data XOR good enough random data = better random data?

2014-09-02 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Thanks for the responses everyone! Reg. making a CSPRNG in JS: I don't have experience and wouldn't trust it. Using someone else's is even worse, I find other's often do things even worse (somehow). And seeding it would sort of have moved the problem rather than solving it. A PRNG shouldn't be

Re: [cryptography] Weak random data XOR good enough random data = better random data?

2014-09-02 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Come to think of it, is there or why isn't there a block-cipher mode that chains using a hashing algorithm? ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Finally! Hyperledger is a trust N out of a selected M ledger system!

2014-08-29 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2014-07-11 12:38 GMT+02:00 L. M. Goodman lmgood...@hushmail.com: B) As I've mentioned before, I think the gap can be bridged by using social networks to form consensus... but it's tricky. I've been playing with some datasets from G+ and Facebook (snap.standford.edu) but they were too

[cryptography] Weak random data XOR good enough random data = better random data?

2014-07-28 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Hey everyone, If I XOR probably random data with good enough random data, does that result in at least good enough random data? I'm working on some Javascript client side crypto. There's a cryptographic quality random generator present in modern browsers, but not in older ones. I also don't

[cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD

2014-07-26 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
http://matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ Is surprisingly often passed around as if it is the end-all to the idea of client side JS crypto. TL;DR: It's a fantastic load of horse crap, mixed in with some extremely generalized cryptography issues that most people never thought about

[cryptography] Finally! Hyperledger is a trust N out of a selected M ledger system!

2014-07-10 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
http://hyperledger.com/ With this nifty little tool one can manage pools that validate transactions. So instead of a consortium of anonymous miners motivated exclusively by profit you can trust a consortium selected according to a predefined procedure. Then if you trust the procedure, you can

Re: [cryptography] How big a speedup through storage?

2014-06-21 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2014-06-20 21:46 GMT+02:00 Greg Zaverucha gr...@microsoft.com: Hi Lodewijk Here are some relevant references. Thanks! A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off. ME Hellman - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, , 1980 http://www.cs.miami.edu/home/burt/learning/Csc609.122/doc/36.pdf

[cryptography] How big a speedup through storage?

2014-06-19 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
With common algorithms, how much would a LOT of storage help? I know this one organization that seems to be building an omnious observation storage facility, even though omnious observation has very mixed effectiveness (read: not really worth it), and I'm wondering; is the NSA planning on using it

Re: [cryptography] One Time Pad Cryptanalysis

2013-10-01 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/9/30 Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de 3. Message integrity does not matter. 4. The security proof assumes there is only one message, ever. 3 and your paper about VOIP regard traffic analysis. I'm not sure what else 3 refers to. Certainly a known plaintext attack would negate that part

Re: [cryptography] Dual_EC_DRBG was cooked, but not AES?

2013-09-22 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/9/22 Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com Furthermore, 3DES continues to remain a viable cipher. I, personally, find that a most commendable and remarkable fact. To use DES with longer keying (and more rounds) is, to this very day, a solid choice. It makes one wonder why the longer keys weren't

Re: [cryptography] [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered for hash collisions for SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 and others

2013-09-16 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
1) We advise mining the block in which you collect your bounty yourself; scriptSigs satisfying the above scriptPubKeys do not cryptographically sign the transaction's outputs. If the bounty value is sufficiently large other miners may find it profitable to reorganize the chain to kill

Re: [cryptography] Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?

2013-09-10 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/9/10 David D da...@7tele.com Quote, You've got to think (NSA claims to be the biggest employer of mathematicians) that seeing the illegal activities the US has been getting up to with the fruits of their labour that they may have a mathematician retention or motivation problem on their

Re: [cryptography] what has the NSA broken?

2013-09-06 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/9/6 ianG i...@iang.org Hmmm, curious. I haven't seen that. I would also suspect it breaks a lot of CPSs and user agreements. But no matter, they're all broken anyway. A 'user agreement' is an agreement between a company and a 'user'. All claims in it shall hold valid unless law

Re: [cryptography] Snowden Induced Mea Culpas

2013-08-25 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Assume all mayor cryptotools are exploited. Sad but true. Any other reason people complain OpenSSL is written in tongues (so to speak)? Hiding exploits is easier in a mess. That said the people in the IETS might be ignorant to the fact that TLS is likely backdoor'ed. The thing with this problem

Re: [cryptography] evidence for threat modelling -- street-sold hardware has been compromised

2013-07-31 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/7/31 grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com And so where does Cisco and Juniper gear come from again... ? Let's not argue about whether Taiwan is China or The People's Republic of China is China ;) They do use foxxcon, but it's not clear whatfor. I can imagine they use foxconn for non-sensitive

Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generator failure in Rasperri Pis?

2013-07-19 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/7/19 Mahrud S dinovi...@gmail.com Isn't the thermal noise a good enough entropy source? I mean, it's a $25 computer, you can't expect much of it. See, sir, you shouldn't wonder why all your data isn't actually encrypted. You shouldn't think it's weird that nothing is secure on your pc.

Re: [cryptography] Ripple a.k.a. OpenCoin

2013-06-26 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/6/26 Taral tar...@gmail.com Truncated sha512 is odd but not wrong, although it seems odd to use both sha256 and truncated sha512 in the same application. I'm going to assume it's for extensibility in case they decide to go to a 512-bit curve. 512 is a lot heavier. The truncation makes

Re: [cryptography] New mailing list for crypto politics/non-tech (Was: Cypherpunks mailing list)

2013-03-25 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/3/25 James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com You don't have cryptopolitics unless the government is trying to ban stuff. Current bans focus on bitcoins and file sharing. To politics there is more than the destructive side. ___ cryptography mailing

Re: [cryptography] chaos-based cryptosystem with quantum crypto similarities

2012-09-29 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
I'd like to try and read it, but how do I get it? I have access to two universities worth of subscriptions so I presume it truly is a matter of Where is it?!. 2012/9/29 d...@geer.org I was asked to read this Fundamentals of a classical chaos-based cryptosystem with some quantum cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?

2012-09-05 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
So to be short: no, there cannot. The absence of new information cannot cause the information needed for decryption to become known. Unless you find some way to reverse that or use a hybrid crypto and non-crypto solution a DMS cannot happen. Anyone disagree? Note that a Bitcoin-like/distributed

Re: [cryptography] Doubts over necessity of SHA-3 cryptography standard

2012-04-10 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
But as SHA-2 is still a pure Merkle–Damgård construction it deviates from an ideal pseudorandom function or random oracle in a couple of ways. Firstly, and most significantly, it is subject to length extension attacks. This means that given a hash value of some secret message, we can

Re: [cryptography] (off-topic) Bitcoin is a repeated lesson in cryptography applications - was endgame

2012-02-27 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
1. No offline transactions, which makes Bitcoin useless for a large class of transactions. On Mon, 27 Feb 2012, James A. Donald wrote: Smartphones. The implicit assumptions here, namely that * everyone who wants to make financial transactions carries a smartphone * smartphones never

Re: [cryptography] Password non-similarity?

2012-01-04 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
2012/1/3 Jonathan Katz jk...@cs.umd.edu On Mon, 2 Jan 2012, lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: The reason for regular change is very good. It's that the low-intensity brute forcing of a password requires a certain stretch of time. Put the change interval low enough and you're safer from them

Re: [cryptography] CAPTCHA as a Security System?

2012-01-02 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
Would a security system that does not model a human attacker really qualify as a security system? If it's man-controlled it certainly does, like a ballistic missile blocking device is also security/safety. In real life security is also an analog kind of thing. Something becomes more secure.

Re: [cryptography] CAPTCHA as a Security System?

2012-01-02 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
I'd like to add to this conversation, as a side note, that a new type of security has (fairly) recently emerged: legal security. It's illegal to break in, so we don't need security. Quite common in convenience stores, people's homes and now, the Internet. Some will find that this sort of security

Re: [cryptography] Password non-similarity?

2012-01-02 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
The reason for regular change is very good. It's that the low-intensity brute forcing of a password requires a certain stretch of time. Put the change interval low enough and you're safer from them. We've had someone talk on-list about a significant amount of failed remote ssh login attempts.

Re: [cryptography] CAPTCHA as a Security System?

2012-01-02 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
My neighborhood Wal*Mart has pretty much eliminated cashiers in favor of self-checkouts. Anyone so inclined could walk in, load up a cart, walk up to a self-checkout, check maybe half the items in the cart, pay for them and leave, with no one the wiser until the physical inventory didn't

Re: [cryptography] Law of unintended consequences?

2011-12-07 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
I figured it'd be effective to create a security awareness group figuring the most prominent (and only effective) way to show people security is a priority is by placing a simple marking, something like this site isn't safe! and contacting the owners with what the exploit is. That'd also provide

Re: [cryptography] How are expired code-signing certs revoked?

2011-12-07 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
I'm afraid signing software is multiple levels of bullocks. Imagine a user just clicking yes when something states Unsigned software, do you really want to install?. Imagine someone working at either a software or a signing company. Imagine someone owning a little bitty software company that's

Re: [cryptography] How are expired code-signing certs revoked?

2011-12-07 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
signing stuff, I'm just saying I don't think it ever helped me. Op 8 december 2011 02:54 schreef Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com het volgende: On 12/07/2011 07:01 PM, lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: I figured it'd be effective to create a security awareness group figuring the most

Re: [cryptography] Declassified NSA Tech Journals

2011-11-27 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
Personally, I think it's hilarious the Extraterrestial Intelligence parts, about how would other races try to contact us haven't changed AT ALL since then and this actually had some orgininal ideas. Like the controlled neutron bursts for communication, that's actually extra usefull because they

Re: [cryptography] -currently available- crypto cards with onboard key storage

2011-10-28 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
Or pluk any old PC/laptop/notebook you have lying around and make it talk over IP. Phones consume less energy though, nice idea. It's arguably more secure than a CPU but I doubt it'd make a noticeable difference (since the rest of the hardware needs to be secure also). 2011/10/28 Morlock Elloi

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin, was Nirvana

2011-09-25 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
What I read in the history books (on wikipediahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_System#Creation_of_Third_Central_Bank) is he main motivation for the third central banking system came from the Panic of 1907 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic_of_1907, which caused renewed demands for

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin, was Nirvana

2011-09-25 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
de la porte wrote: The gold standard was fine as far as I know, as long as the gold flow was steady. And when the gold flow was not steady, inflation and deflation was generally less than 1% a year. I conjecture that the expectation that value of the currency would remain stable

Re: [cryptography] bitcoin scalability to high transaction rates

2011-07-22 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
For a shipped product the ~5 minutes to a few hours delay isn't going to matter much, since the product has to go through shipping first. Kinda like buying an express shipment when you're not at home for the coming few weeks. -Lewis 2011/7/22 Daniel Carosone d...@geek.com.au On Thu, Jul 21,

Re: [cryptography] bitcoin scalability to high transaction rates

2011-07-21 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
There's currently a limited amount of transactions per block, this limit can be changed. There's certain stuff in place to give bigger transactions, older transactions and transactions with higher fee's precedence. That should kill the possibility to truly DoS the network, although it's possible

Re: [cryptography] bitcoin scalability to high transaction rates

2011-07-19 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
This would revive many of the things people have aspired to kill with bitcoins. Among others the creation of money (I can borrow and store more money than I have). It would also mean moving the scalability problem to a centralized system, a trusted party. In other words: wouldn't having money

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin observation

2011-07-08 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
.) Lewis 2011/7/8 Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com 2011/7/7 lodewijk andré de la porte lodewijka...@gmail.com: I honestly don't see how. A transaction has an orgin, which is verified to have the coins, and a destination, which is a public key that must have a private key. AFAIK every public

Re: [cryptography] Is it possible to protect against malicious hw accelerators?

2011-07-08 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
-You could perform a (very simple) software hash or something of the kind to make the data sent to the HW accelerated thingy (performing difficult operations) useless, that's less effective but it should work. Note that this is in fact a new protocol and the applications are different. -A better

Re: [cryptography] Digital cash in the news...

2011-06-13 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
I get back from vacation and suddenly my inbox is filled with misconceptions. While this is supossed to be a fairly technical mailinglist (about cryptography) it seems clear many people haven't quite understood bitcoins' workings. Let me break it down: * With a private/public key combination you

Re: [cryptography] Point compression prior art?

2011-05-21 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
Usage of the word rolling is also trademarked and limited. You forgot about wheels that do not roll. Can't use that either. You may have found some people using wheels for rolling. They should be frowned upon, given extra-intimate pat-downs, blackmailed, arrested anyway, made fun of before

Re: [cryptography] Message encryption standards?

2011-05-10 Thread lodewijk andré de la porte
Rot13 (or any other number) and many other pre-digital era message encription methods. What is for you the advantage of this kind of encription? 2011/5/10 Paul Crowley p...@ciphergoth.org: Most standards that include encryption are to do with transport-level encryption (SSL, SSH, IPSec/IKE, WPA