On Wed, Sep 5, 2012 at 9:51 AM, StealthMonger
stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be
revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be
cryptographically strong and not rely on a
Doh, don't know why I brought public-key crypto into this. There isn't
a need for it. Just pick, say, an AES key and give the trustee some of
the key's bits so they only have to brute force part of the key.
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 4:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Sep 5
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 5:18 AM, Darren J
On Sat, Dec 31, 2011 at 5:02 PM, Landon ljrhur...@gmail.com wrote:
A lot of the password reuse is simply adding +1 or something on
the end. Since the base of the password stays the same, couldn't
you just hash the first and second halves of the new and old
passwords separately and compare
On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
In the presence of such a [self-revoking] revocation [of a root certificate]
applications can react in one of three ways: they can accept the CRL
that revokes the certificate as valid and revoke it, they can reject
On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 1:56 AM, Sandy Harris sandyinch...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 2:04 PM, Sandy Harris sandyinch...@gmail.com wrote:
...[code and pdf] is at: ftp://ftp.cs.sjtu.edu.cn:990/sandy/maxwell/
That should be available for anon FTP, but I have not tested it from
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 3:20 PM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 8:26 AM, Jack Lloyd ll...@randombit.net wrote:
An interesting new eprint on attacking AES using cache timings
Cache Games - Bringing Access Based Cache Attacks on AES to Practice
Endre Bangerter
On Fri, Sep 10, 2010 at 2:06 PM,
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
...something where you can spend a few bits authenticating each
frame of a movie, or sound sample, for example, and have some
probabilistic chance of detecting alteration at each frame.
On Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at
