Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 3:08 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote: But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as to whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken or even trapdoor weaken DL curve parameters, when the seeds are allowed to look

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 08:47:49AM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 3:08 AM, Adam Back [1]a...@cypherspace.org wrote: But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as to whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote: Right but weak parameter arguments are very dangerous - the US national infrastructure they're supposed to be protecting could be weakened when someone else finds the weakness. As the fallout from the Snowden debacle has

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Jeffrey Goldberg
On 2013-10-01, at 12:54 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote: I wouldn't put it past them to intentionally weaken the NIST curves. This is what has changed. Previously, I believed that they *wouldn’t* try to do something like that. Now we need to review things in terms of capability.

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread yersinia
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 9:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg jeff...@goldmark.orgwrote: On 2013-10-01, at 12:54 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote: I wouldn't put it past them to intentionally weaken the NIST curves. This is what has changed. Previously, I believed that they *wouldn’t* try to do

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg jeff...@goldmark.orgwrote: If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering their tracks in such a way, why wouldn’t they have pulled the same trick with Dual_EC_DRBG? tinfoilhatThey wanted us to think they were incompetent,

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-10-02 06:10, Tony Arcieri wrote: tinfoilhatThey wanted us to think they were incompetent, so we would expect that Dual_EC_DRBG was their failed attempt to tamper with a cryptographic standard, and so we would overlook the more sinister and subtle attempts to tamper with the NIST

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Jeffrey Goldberg
On 2013-10-01, at 3:10 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg jeff...@goldmark.org wrote: If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering their tracks in such a way, why wouldn’t they have pulled the same trick with