On 2013-09-17 02:56, Seth David Schoen wrote:
Well, there's a distinction between RNGs that have been maliciously
designed and RNGs that are just extremely poor (or just are
inadequately seeded but their designers or users don't realize this).
It sounds like such extremely poor RNGs are
See:
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/fatal-crypto-flaw-in-some-government-certified-smartcards-makes-forgery-a-snap/
for overview, and:
http://smartfacts.cr.yp.to/
for more details of the research.
Would it be advisable to implement a test, prior to any certification of an
RNG,
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the
algorithm and the actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is
because it is extremely easy to create a crappy rng that fools the
smartest analytical tool on the planet. it is not that easy to fool an
attacker that reverse
Krisztián Pintér writes:
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the algorithm
and the actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is because it
is extremely easy to create a crappy rng that fools the smartest
analytical tool on the planet. it is not that easy to fool an
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the algorithm and the
actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is because it is extremely easy to
create a crappy rng that fools the smartest analytical tool on the planet. it
is not that easy to fool an attacker that reverse
On 2013-09-16, at 11:56 AM, Seth David Schoen sch...@loyalty.org wrote:
Well, there's a distinction between RNGs that have been maliciously
designed and RNGs that are just extremely poor
This has been something that I’ve been trying to learn more about in the past
week or so. And if this
