Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-10 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from Eric Young - Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 20:58:20 +1000 From: Eric Young To: Eugen Leitl Cc: cypherpu...@al-qaeda.net, i...@postbiota.org, zs-...@zerostate.is, Cryptography List Subject: Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-09 Thread Marcus Brinkmann
On 09/07/2013 07:48 PM, David Johnston wrote: > It interesting to consider the possibilities of corruption and deception > that may exist in product design. It's a lot more alarming when it's > your own design that is being accused of having been backdoored. > Claiming the NSA colluded with intel t

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-08 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-09-09 1:54 AM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:00:39PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain t

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-08 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:00:39PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: > >On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > >>Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain the > >>very strange design decision to whiten

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: Access to the raw output would have made it possible to determine that the random numbers were in fact generated by the physical process described, since it is hard and would cost a lot of silicon to simulate the various subtle offwhite characteri

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-09-08 1:25 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain the very strange design decision to whiten the numbers on chip, and not provide direct access to the raw unwhitened ou

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 08:34:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > > Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain the > very strange design decision to whiten the numbers on chip, and not > provide direct access to the raw unwhitened output. You know as soon as anyone complained

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-09-08 3:48 AM, David Johnston wrote: Claiming the NSA colluded with intel to backdoor RdRand is also to accuse me personally of having colluded with the NSA in producing a subverted design. I did not. Well, since you personally did this, would you care to explain the very strange desi

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 1:48 PM, David Johnston wrote: > On 9/6/2013 2:03 PM, grarpamp wrote: >> ... >>> However, I claim that the fear is well founded and should be taken into >>> account by all threat models. > It interesting to consider the possibilities of corruption and deception > that may ex

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 09:05:33PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > This pretty much rules out CPU-integral RNGs. It has to be > a third-party add-on (USB or PCIe), and it has to be open hardware. I think you take this more than a little too far. I see CPU-integral RNGs as very valuable source to b

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread David Johnston
On 9/7/2013 12:05 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: How badly patent-entangled is Intel's RNG? Can the fundamental principle be extracted into an open design? less available, less secure RNGs. This I expect would serve the needs of the NSA well. It's SP800-90A, B & C (but B & C are draft). _

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 10:48:02AM -0700, David Johnston wrote: > It interesting to consider the possibilities of corruption and > deception that may exist in product design. It's a lot more alarming > when it's your own design that is being accused of having been > backdoored. Claiming the NSA co

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 10:48:02AM -0700, David Johnston wrote: > > It interesting to consider the possibilities of corruption and > deception that may exist in product design. It's a lot more alarming > when it's your own design that is being accused of having been > backdoored. Claiming the NSA c

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-07 Thread David Johnston
On 9/6/2013 2:03 PM, grarpamp wrote: Does anyone put any stock into the rumors floating lately that the government may have influenced Intel and/or AMD into altering However, I claim that the fear is well founded and should be taken into account by all threat models. It interesting to consid

[cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-06 Thread grarpamp
On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl wrote: > - Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson - > > From: Andy Isaacson > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - > rumors > > On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote: >> Does anyone put any stock into the ru

Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG

2013-09-06 Thread Bill St. Clair
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 5:03 PM, grarpamp wrote: >On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl wrote: > >> If your AES instructions don't do AES, then testing >> against a software implementation will show it! > > Unless some of those billion gates are dedicated to > recognizing and modifying software AES to match, and