[cryptography] caring requires data
On 13/10/2014 01:03 am, coderman wrote: On 9/22/14, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: ... Please elaborate. TKIP has not been identified as a ‘active attack’ vector. hi nymble, it appears no one cares about downgrade attacks, like no one cares about MitM (see mobile apps and software update mechanisms). [0] No, and I argue that nobody should care about MITM nor downgrade attacks nor any other theoretical laboratory thing. I also argue that people shouldn't worry about shark attacks, lightning or wearing body armour when shopping. What distinguishes what we should care about and what we shouldn't is data. And analysis of that data. In absence of data, you're in FUD land. Just another religion, or another lightning rod salesman [1]. 0. no one cares - this is not strictly true; people care a bit more if you have done significant and detailed analysis of the sort that eats lives by the quarter-year. i have long since quit giving freebies freely, and instead pick my disclosures carefully with significant limitations. Well, if that translated to data of actual attacks, hacks, losses, then I'd have more sympathy. Otherwise, it's all sales in the market for silver bullets. Or indistinguishable from, the harder you want people to care, the more a salesman copies your technique ... perhaps i should re-state: no one working in the public interest cares. there is a roaring business for silence and proprietary development, and these people care quite a bit. Yeah, ain't that the truth. Meanwhile, data... iang [1] a lightning rod salesman is an expression in earlier American times which refers to someone selling something you don't really need. I think, perhaps others could explain it better... ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] caring requires data
On 13/10/2014 14:32 pm, coderman wrote: On 10/13/14, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: ... No, and I argue that nobody should care about MITM nor downgrade attacks nor any other theoretical laboratory thing. I also argue that people shouldn't worry about shark attacks, lightning or wearing body armour when shopping. ... What distinguishes what we should care about and what we shouldn't is data. And analysis of that data. indeed. thanks for showing me the light, ian! your welcome ;-) Q: 'Should I disable Dual_EC_DRBG?' A: The data shows zero risk of an attacker compromising the known vulnerability of a specially seed random number generator. Do not change; keep using Dual_EC_DRBG! Ah well, there is another rule we should always bring remember: Do not use known-crap crypto. Dual_EC_DRBG is an example of a crap RNG. For which we have data going back to 2006 showing it is a bad design. Others in this category include: RC4, DES, MD5, various wifi junk protocols, etc. Q: 'Should I switch away from 1024 bit strength RSA keys?' A: The data shows zero risk of an attacker compromising the known vulnerability of a insufficiently large RSA key as the cost is prohibitive and no publicly demonstrated device exists. Do not change to larger keys; keep using 1024 bit RSA! I agree with that, and I'm on record for it in the print media. I am not part of the NIST lemmings craze. So, assuming you think I'm crazy, let's postulate that the NSA has a box that can crunch a 1024 key in a day. What's the risk? Over a year, the risk to *you* is that one of your keys is in the top 365 keys targeted to attack, over this coming year. Is that likely? If it is ... well, my advice is not for you, you're another sort of person altogether ;-) WYTM? The world that is concerned about the NSA is terrified of open surveillance. RSA1024 kills open surveillance dead. Q: 'Should I worry about the auto-update behavior of my devices or computers?' A: The data shows minimal risk of an attacker compromising your systems via this method. Don't bother changing your vulnerable auto update any where any time any how; you're probably safe! Actually, I thought there was data on this which shows that auto-update keeps devices more secure, suffer less problems. I think Microsoft have published on this, anyone care to comment? it's all so easy now... :) :) iang ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
