But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1!
It doesn't have infinite possibilies for object definitions
requiring help from standards committees, multiple incompatible
data representations with different kinds of ambiguity,
or ugly API packages that are too large to believe that
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
The survey was commissioned by Newsweek. An explanation from Princeton
Survey Research Associates and the exact wording of the question asked
(which did cover privacy and business impact) is here:
http://www.politechbot.com/p-02530.html
The
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Pawel Krawczyk wrote:
On Mon, Sep 17, 2001 at 01:44:57PM -0700, Bram Cohen wrote:
What is important, it *doesn't* feed the built-in Linux kernel PRNG
available in /dev/urandom and /dev/random, so you have either to only
use the hardware generator or feed
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Because it is typically slower by many times than hand
tuned assembler.
On 14 Sep 2001, at 14:24, Ian Goldberg wrote:
Are you sure? For general code, that certainly hasn't been
true in a long time; optimizing
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46953,00.html
Bush Bill Rewrites Spy Laws
By Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
2:00 a.m. Sep. 19, 2001 PDT
WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration will ask for more power to
eavesdrop on phone calls, the Internet and voicemail
--
On 19 Sep 2001, at 11:01, Declan McCullagh wrote:
According to the two-page outline -- which lacks key
details and could change before it's sent to Capitol
Hill -- police would be able to conduct more wiretaps
and use the Carnivore surveillance system in more
Kevin E. Fu [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1! It doesn't have
infinite possibilies for object definitions requiring help from standards
committees, multiple incompatible data representations with different kinds of
ambiguity, or ugly API
On Wed, Sep 19, 2001 at 01:12:44AM -0700, Bram Cohen wrote:
not necessary in general case
Since most applications reading /dev/random don't want random numbers
anyway?
Here I meant exactly what you said about /dev/random religion. On the
other hand feeding the /dev/random with i810 during
At 1:12 AM -0700 9/19/01, Bram Cohen wrote:
Of course, there's the religion of people who say that /dev/random output
'needs' to contain 'all real' entropy, despite the absolute zero increase
in security this results in and the disastrous effect it can have on
performance.
If I am generating one
Bram Cohen wrote:
On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, Pawel Krawczyk wrote:
[..]
It's not that stupid, as feeding the PRNG from i810_rng at the kernel
level would be resource intensive,
You only have to do it once at startup to get enough entropy in there.
If your machine is left on for months or years
The real-RNG in the Intel chip generates something like 75 kbits/sec
of processed random bits. These are merely wasted if nobody reads them
before it generates 75kbits more in the next second.
I suggest that if application programs don't read all of these bits
out of /dev/intel-rng (or whatever
On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Bram Cohen wrote:
You only have to do it once at startup to get enough entropy in there.
If your machine is left on for months or years the seed entropy would become
a big target. If your PRNG status is compromised then all future uses of
On Mon, 17 Sep 2001, Greg Rose wrote:
There is one very simple reason why they might have wanted the encryption
switched off. Wiretapping at the base station requires a wiretap order,
whereas sniffing the airwaves in a matter of national security is something
the NSA is allowed to do (but
At 03:55 20/09/2001, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Paul Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
Kevin E. Fu [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
But XDR is so BORING compared to a REAL standard like ASN.1!
I can feel this sliding into a specification language debate, but I
- Original Message -
From: Theodore Tso [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John Gilmore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Pawel Krawczyk [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Bram Cohen
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 5:17 AM
Subject: Re: chip-level randomness?
[...]
On
Or also their XML equivalents:
http://xml.coverpages.org/xml-spki.html
Enzo
- Original Message -
From: Paul Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010918/ts/attack_investigation_dc_23.html
Tuesday September 18 7:55 PM ET
News Home - Yahoo! - My Yahoo! - News Alerts - Help
FBI Investigating Florida Terrorist Connection (WKMG, Orlando)
By James Vicini
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The FBI (news -
Bram,
I need _lots_ of random-looking bits to use as covertraffic, so I'm using
continuous reseeding (of a BBS PRNG) using i810_rng output on i386 platform
as well as other sources (the usual suspects plus CD latency plus an
optional USB feed-through rng device a bit like a dongle). I don't use
On Wed, Sep 19, 2001 at 09:23:56AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not so good. Anyone can easily suspect me of being a
terrorist, if I should discuss certain topics that are of
interest to this list.
Yeah, the draft sent to Congress late Wednesday doesn't have crypto
restrictions, but it
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