Re: Columbia crypto box

2003-02-10 Thread Don Davis
Bill Frantz writes: * Fast key setup (Forget tossing the 256 bytes of key stream. The designers weren't crypto engineers. Personally, I'd toss the first 1024.) Steven M. Bellovin wrote: There may be a cryptographically sound reason to discard that much, but it's not without cost.

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Don Davis
. - don davis, boston vuln-dev thread: http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/82/298061/2002-10-28/2002-11-03/1 (thanks to tim fredenburg sending this URL to me.) summary: programmers can obstruct dead-code elimination in various ways: - use the volatile attribute (but correctly); o

Re: Constructing capability URLs

2002-09-04 Thread Don Davis
enough for your application. - don davis, boston - - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

new attack on des

2002-09-04 Thread Don Davis
does anyone know of an on-line copy of this paper? - don davis, boston http://www.ece.wpi.edu/research/crypt/seminar/ A New Class of Side-Channel Attacks on DES, Prof. Christof Paar, Chair for Communication Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany Thursday

Re: Montgomery Multiplication

2002-07-02 Thread Don Davis
I was just wondering if anyone knew where to get a good explanation of Montgomery multiplication for the non-mathematician? here's an explanation i wrote a couple of years ago: - don davis, boston what's going on with montgomery reduction: do you remember

Re: Proving security protocols

2001-11-01 Thread Don Davis
on her group's publications page: http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/CRYPTOindex.html - don davis, boston - - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: Crypographically Strong Software Distribution HOWTO

2001-07-02 Thread Don Davis
against md5 MACs, ie, when md5 is used to hash a symmetric key with the plaintext. but, i generally tell clients to use sha-1 even for MACs, just to avoid confusing their customers. - don davis, boston

crypto flaw in secure mail standards

2001-06-23 Thread Don Davis
/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.html - don davis, boston http://world.std.com/~dtd - - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

crypto flaw in secure mail standards

2001-06-22 Thread Don Davis
://www.usenix.org/events/usenix01/usenix01.pdf Citation: Don Davis, Defective Sign Encrypt in S/MIME, PKCS#7, MOSS, PEM, PGP, and XML. To appear in Proc. Usenix Tech. Conf. 2001, Boston. June 25-30, 2001. A short summary: All current secure-mail standards have a significant cryptographic flaw