Re: NYT article on steganography

2001-10-31 Thread John Denker
At 08:57 PM 10/30/01 -0500, vertigo commended to our attention: http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt Here is a review I wrote back in 1998: 1) In Ron's note, most of the statements about the technology are true. In a narrowly technical sense the scheme would work. 2) The scheme is

Re: Did the US defeat wiretapping success?

2001-09-17 Thread John Denker
At 11:21 PM 9/16/01 -0400, P.J. Ponder wrote: Senator Hatch was interviewed by national media on Tuesday and stated that the US government had voice intercepts of calls talking about success with two targets. He was later criticized for talking about the intercepts. Hm, criticized? Why not

Re: Did the US defeat wiretapping success?

2001-09-17 Thread John Denker
At 01:25 PM 9/17/01 -0500, Matt Crawford wrote: Somehow I doubt that it was not a speech or debate in the senate. And what is the basis for this doubt? All evidence, including that which I quoted in my original message, indicates that he first said it in a media interview. Here is some more

Re: How to ban crypto?

2001-09-16 Thread John Denker
At 06:58 PM 9/16/01 +0200, Axel H Horns wrote: During the past years I managed to convince a handful of clients and colleagues to make use of PGP in order to protect confidential information when sending e-mail messages. Of course, if PGP would be banned in Germany by some legislation I would

Re: NSA tapping undersea fibers?

2001-06-03 Thread John Denker
I wrote: First, it should be obvious that They don't need a submarine to tap cables that already make landfall in the US, which is the vast majority: Then at 07:33 PM 6/1/01 +0100, Peter Fairbrother wrote: Of course they have reasons to want to tap cables that make landfall in the US. 1) I

Re: compression nulls in cryptosystems

2001-05-31 Thread John Denker
At 10:39 AM 5/29/01 -0400, Matt Blaze wrote: While I agree in principle that plaintext with a high information content probably makes it harder to mount a ciphertext-only attack against most (non-randomized, at least) secret-key cryptosystems, I'm not at all convinced that the security benefits