e smallest representation, as a compression of a given
language (the only sense in which this makes sense).
Joseph Ashwood
Trust Laboratories
http://www.trustlaboratories.com
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[snips omitted, reordering also occurred for response coherency]
- Original Message -
From: "Anton Stiglic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Shamir factoring machine uninteresting?
> >From: "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > I find it odd that there has been so little comment on T
- Original Message -
From: "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Here is a scenario: Scott wants Alice to generate a key pair after
> which he will receive Alice's public key. At the same time, Scott wants
> to make sure that this key pair is newly generated (has not been used
> be
- Original Message -
From: "Roy M.Silvernail" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> And here, I thought that a portion of the security embodied in a SecurID
> token was the fact that it was a tamper-resistant, independent piece of
> hardware. Now M$ wants to put the PRNG out in plain view, along with its
- Original Message -
From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an
owner,
> > and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this
was
> > designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a p
This is going to be a very long, and very boring message. But it should
highlight why we have differing opinions about so very many capabilities of
the TCPA system. For the sake of attempting to avoid supplying too little
information, I have simply searched for the term and will make comments on
e
- Original Message -
From: "Ben Laurie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> > There is nothing stopping a virtualized version being created.
> What prevents this from being useful is the lack of an appropriate
> certificate for the private key
Lately on both of these lists there has been quite some discussion about
TCPA and Palladium, the good, the bad, the ugly, and the anonymous. :)
However there is something that is very much worth noting, at least about
TCPA.
There is nothing stopping a virtualized version being created.
There is
- Original Message -
From: "AARG! Anonymous" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[brief description of Document Revocation List]
>Seth's scheme doesn't rely on TCPA/Palladium.
Actually it does, in order to make it valuable. Without a hardware assist,
the attack works like this:
Hack your software (which
[I've got some doubts about the content here but I think the
discussion is certainly on charter --Perry]
Since I have received a number of private replies all saying approximately
the same thing; lookup for small n, use algo for large. Allow me to extend
my observation.
To quote myself from earli
- Original Message -
From: "John S. Denker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "David Honig" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'Hannes R. Boehm'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'Ian
Hill'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, July 27, 2002 10:52 AM
Subject: Re: building a true
- Original Message -
From: "Eugen Leitl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: building a true RNG (was: Quantum Computing ...)
> I've got a framegrabber with a 640x480 24 bit/pixel camera. It doesn't
> compress, is rather noisy, and since self-adjusting I get the maximum
> entropy at maximum
- Original Message -
From: "John Saylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2002 3:14 PM
Subject: authentication protocols
> I'd like to find an authentication protocol that fits my needs:
> 1. 2 [automated] parties
> 2. no trusted 3rd party intemediary ['
- Original Message -
From: "bernie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Some of the people here wants to use the .NET for critical applications.
I'm sorry.
> How secure is the .NET?
The short answer is that it isn't secure. There are two main problems with
it being secure. The first is the password
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