--- begin forwarded text
Status: RO Mailing-List: contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]; run by ezmlm Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2003 23:38:14 +0100 (CET) From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [p2p-hackers] Anonymity tutorial at MIT, Wed Jan 15, 7-10pm (fwd) -- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBMTO: N48 04'14.8'' E11 36'41.2'' http://eugen.leitl.org 83E5CA02: EDE4 7193 0833 A96B 07A7 1A88 AA58 0E89 83E5 CA02 http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2003 22:58:53 -0500 From: Roger Dingledine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [p2p-hackers] Anonymity tutorial at MIT, Wed Jan 15, 7-10pm [Please forward anywhere you think might be interested. And if you're a p2p-hacker in Boston, come and meet some of the others.] I'm doing a tutorial on anonymity designs, as part of the MIT I/S series of talks this January. It will be along the lines of my Blackhat and Defcon talks from August, but going into more detail. We'll likely have some form of refreshments. The room is plenty big, so feel free to show up, and bring plenty of questions. I'll adapt the material based on audience clue and interests. Please forward this to other relevant/interested lists. "Why is anonymity so hard?" Roger Dingledine Wednesday, Jan 15, 7-10pm MIT Room 54-100 (http://whereis.mit.edu/bin/map?locate=bldg_54) Open to the public With reasonable anonymity designs that are decades old, it seems clear that we should have a reliable, secure, and ubiquitous anonymity network by now. But apart from the purely technical challenges, there are social barriers as well. The complexity of distributing trust, problems funding the infrastructure or getting volunteers to run it, and challenge of making users comfortable all conspire to make deploying a strong anonymity system very difficult. I'll start with a crash course on anonymity designs, and compare ease of deployment based on the above issues. I will focus on Mixminion, a new message-based anonymous remailer protocol and Onion Routing, a low-latency stream-based anonymous communication system. I'll also spend some time talking about the link padding / dummy traffic problem. Throughout, I'll share some intuition about how to break these systems and how to fix them. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]