At 9:00 PM -0700 8/30/02, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>Bill Frantz writes, regarding the possibility that the Palladium
>architecture could be designed to resist the use of encrypted
>code:
>
>> All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
>> space to support compilation.
>
>Well
Bill Frantz writes, regarding the possibility that the Palladium
architecture could be designed to resist the use of encrypted
code:
> All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
> space to support compilation.
Well, this is usually done by storing the data to the dis
Bill Frantz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
> space to support compilation. Even if you don't allow compilation, most
> modern systems have enough different powerful scripting languages that
> interpretation is sufficient to su
At 9:40 PM -0700 8/29/02, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>There is a computer design called the Harvard architecture which has a
>strict separation between code and data space, and conceivably Palladium
>could use a similar approach to make it impossible to run decrypted code.
>Adopting this approach would a
Paul Crowley asks: > I'm informed that malware authors often go to some
lengths to prevent > their software from being disassembled. Could they
use Palladium for > this end? Are there any ways in which the facilities
that Palladium > and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author
who wants
On 29 Aug 2002, Paul Crowley wrote:
>I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
>their software from being disassembled. Could they use Palladium for
>this end? Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
>and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware
At 01:50 AM 08/29/2002 +0100, Paul Crowley wrote:
>I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
>their software from being disassembled. Could they use Palladium for
>this end? Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
>and TCPA provide could be useful to
Paul Crowley wrote:
> I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
> their software from being disassembled. Could they use Palladium for
> this end? Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
> and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author who want
I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
their software from being disassembled. Could they use Palladium for
this end? Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author who wants to
frustrate legitimate at
