Re: Columbia crypto box
Bill Stewart wrote: These days nobody *has* a better cryptosystem than you do They might have a cheaper one or a faster one, but for ten years the public's been able to get free planet-sized-computer-proof crypto ... I seem to remember that the Nazis said the same thing about Enigma. Even when evidence began to filter back that it had been broken, they ignored it because they were so confident that a break was impossible. It's true that protocol and programming problems account for the huge majority of security holes. The WEP break, though, was one notable exception. They were using an established cryptosystem (RC4) with a planet sized key (128 bits). However, a weakness in RC4 itself let them down. ... if you don't like it, you can switch from 3DES and 1024-bit RSA to 5DES and/or 4096-bit RSA. I don't know about 4096-bit, but you should switch to something if you care about security; recent results imply that it may be possible to factor 1024-bit numbers. -- Pete - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Columbia crypto box
On Sat, 8 Feb 2003, Lucky Green wrote: In July of 1997, only days after the Mars Pathfinder mission and its Sojourner Rover successfully landed on Mars, I innocently inquired on the Cypherpunks mailing list if any subscribers happened to know if and how NASA authenticates the command uplink to what at the time was arguably the coolest RC toy in the solar system. ... Apparently, my original inquiry had been copied and forwarded several times. By the time my inquiry had reached the office of the President, just as in a children's' game of telephone, my question of are they using any decent crypto had turned in to hackers ready to take over Mars Rover. ... Needless to say and regardless of anyone's intent, such concern would be entirely unfounded if the uplink were securely authenticated. Which I believes represents an answer to my initial question as to whether the uplink is securely authenticated. Actually, I don't think it does. It's been my experience that the decision-makers never even *KNOW* whether their systems are secure. They've been sold snake-oil claims of security so many times, and, inevitably, seen those systems compromised, that even when responsible and knowledgeable engineers say a system is secure, they have to regard it as just another claim of the same type that's been proven false before. So I can easily imagine them just not knowing whether the link was secure, thinking that the NASA engineer's job of securing uplinks might be no better than Microsoft's job of securing communications or operating systems, because they've had it demonstrated time and again that even when they hear words like secure, the system can be compromised. The fact is that the NASA engineer has a huge advantage; s/he's not working for a marketing department that will toss security for convenience, s/he's not working on something whose code has to be copied a million times and distributed to people with debuggers all over the world, s/he's not trying to hide information from people on their own computer systems, and s/he's not complying with deals made with various people that require backdoors and transparency to law enforcement in every box. So the NASA engineer's actually got a chance of making something secure, where the Microsoft engineer didn't. Microsoft has to claim their junk is secure, but in their case it's just marketing gas. But all this is below the notice of the decision makers; they *LIVE* in a world where marketing gas is indistinguishable from reality, because they don't have the engineer's knowledge of the issues. So having the decision makers get real nervous was likely to happen, whether the link is secure or not. There's no information there except that the decision makers have finally realized they don't really *know* whether the link is secure. That's progress, of a sort. [Remind me to some time recount the tale of my discussing key management with the chief-cryptographer for a battlefield communication system considerably younger than the shuttle fleet. Appalling does not being to describe it]. Battlefield systems have been that way forever. Battlefield information only has to remain secure for a few seconds to a few hours, and they exploit that to the max in making the systems flexible and fast enough for actual use. You want appalling? In the civil war, they used monoalphabetic substitution as a trench code -- on both sides. Bear - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PATRIOT2 affects individuals, citizens authentication
Reading the HTML version: http://www.dailyrotten.com/source-docs/patriot2draft.html ... investigations of lone wolf terrorists or sleeper cells may not be authorized under FISA. ... This provision would expand FISA's definition of foreign power to include all persons, regardless of whether they are affiliated with an international terrorist group ... Requiring the additional showing that the intelligence gathering violates the laws of the United States is both unnecessary and counterproductive, as such activities threaten the national security regardless of whether they are illegal. ... However, there does not appear to be a statutory defense for agents who engage in surveillance or searches pursuant to FISA authorities under which no prior court approval is required ... This provision would clarify that the good faith reliance defense is available, not just when agents are acting pursuant to a FISA Court order, but also when they are acting pursuant to a lawful authorization from the President or the Attorney General. ... Another context in which different types of foreign powers are treated differently is the FISA definition of United States person. United States persons have a more protected status under FISA for certain purposes, such as dissemination of information. ... The amendments in this section will facilitate the investigation of threats to the national security posed by such groups by reassigning them to the less protected status now accorded to foreign powers ... 13.(b) The terms 'encrypt' and 'encryption' refer to the 14.scrambling (and descrambling) of wire communications, electronic 15.communications, or electronically stored information, using 16.mathematical formulas or algorithms in order to preserve the 17.confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of, and prevent unauthorized 18.recipients from accessing or altering, such communications or 19.information. Even integrity and authenticity would be subject to investigation for Unlawful use of encryption. We often write scenarios where a monkey in the middle (MITM) tampers with communications. Our national security apparatus prefers that it be able to alter our communications and impersonate those under investigation. Remember, I was investigated for treason by the FBI for merely writing the specification for PPP CHAP, an authentication protocol. -- William Allen Simpson Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
