Australian government says CoE Cybercrime Convention DOES confer GAK powers

2001-07-07 Thread Caspar Bowden
On 14th November 2000, Peter Csonka of the Council of Europe was reported as denying that the Cybercrime convention conferred powers for government access to encryption keys (That was never our intention http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/2000/45/ns-19057.html) However on the Second Reading of the

Fwd: Re: Crypographically Strong Software Distribution HOWTO

2001-07-07 Thread Greg Broiles
More from Rodney - I'm avoiding the is law relevant? branch of this thread because I think it's wandering off-topic, but can continue in private email if any of the participants think it's likely to be productive. Date: Sat, 07 Jul 2001 08:33:29 -0700 To: Greg Broiles [EMAIL PROTECTED] From:

Re: non-repudiation, was Re: crypto flaw in secure mail standards

2001-07-07 Thread Lynn . Wheeler
one of the biggest problems that has led to most of the regulations is the ease that account-number harvesting can occur and then the account number used in fraudulent, non-authenticated transactions. The SET-like protocols didn't address this issue. However, there is a huge amount of stuff

Re: non-repudiation, was Re: crypto flaw in secure mail standards

2001-07-07 Thread Lynn . Wheeler
... and the x9.59 solution was designed to be applicable to all account-based, electronic payments not just credit ... but all. much of the regs. are specific to credit (because of the ease that account-number harvesting can lead to fraudulent, non-authenticated transactions) ... while

Re: non-repudiation, was Re: crypto flaw in secure mail standards

2001-07-07 Thread Eric Rescorla
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: one of the biggest problems that has led to most of the regulations is the ease that account-number harvesting can occur and then the account number used in fraudulent, non-authenticated transactions. The SET-like protocols didn't address this issue. How so? In at