There is a list of encrypted messages, published on a bulletin board. Rackel
and only Rackel can decrypt this messages. Encryption is probabilistic, for
instance ElGamal: E(m)=(g^r, h^r m), where h=g^s with {s} be the private
key of Racel and {r} be a randomness chosen by the sender.
Rackel
One reference out of my mind is:
* Yevgeniy Dodis, Shaih Halevi and Tal Rabin, A Cryptographic Solution
to a Game Theoretic Problem , CRYPTO 2000.
http://www.toc.lcs.mit.edu/~yevgen/ps/game-abs.html
(See Appendix A, esp A.1, and references therein)
Helger Lipmaa
The problem posed is actually a special case of the problem solved
in a paper that was recently accepted at ACM-CCS (Philadelphia,
November 2001.)
C. Andrew Neff. Verifiable, Secret Shuffles of ElGamal Encrypted
Data for Secure Multi-Authority Elections
(For various reasons, the title uses
specific ref.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#sslset1
in a thread with one of the SET people from visa ... they stated that it
was not designed to prevent a valid merchant from getting the PAN . in
fact, that there are standard credit card businness process that require
the merchant
for a fuller discussion of SSL SET discussion ... set x9a10 mailing list
archives
http://lists.commerce.net/archives/ansi-epay/199905/maillist.html
the above has the postings in reverse cronological order.
but, basically the bottom line is that there are a number of merchant
credit card
OpenSSL version 0.9.6a released
===
OpenSSL - The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS
http://www.openssl.org/
The OpenSSL project team is pleased to announce the release of version
0.9.6a of our open source toolkit for SSL/TLS. This new OpenSSL version
is
As a few people noticed, not only was the announcement of OpenSSL 0.9.6b sent
more than once (due to, eh, technical error...), but the version number was
0.9.6a everywhere in the message body!
So, with my deepest appologies, here is the correct text:
ØZ .-
