Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Axel H Horns
On 3 Jan 2070, at 9:41, Nicholas Brawn wrote: What's the state of the game with PGP and GPG compatibility? Interesting question. I'm using PGP 6.5.8 for my professional confidential e-mails and sometimes I get complaints from GnuPG users saying they can't use my Pubkey. Currently I'm

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 3 Jan 1970 09:41:26 +1000, Nicholas Brawn said: What's the state of the game with PGP and GPG compatibility? According to the bug reports I receive for GnuPG, it seems that even the latest versions of PGP (7.0.3?) are still not OpenPGP compatible. At least they still don't understand

Re: High-tech Thieves Snatch Data From ATMs

2002-01-15 Thread Jim Cheesman
Something similar happened in England a few years back: Some cybercrooks* set up an entire false bank - only the shop frontage and the cash machine, which would display the customary Sorry this service not available blah blah blah message if the user tried to get cash out. I believe the bank

Re: CFP: PKI research workshop

2002-01-15 Thread D. A. Honig
At 01:59 PM 1/14/02 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote: Saying that SSL without certificates is fine as long as you don't have active attacks is kind of like saying that leaving your front door open is fine as long as noone tries to break in. No, its more. SSL sans certs is like using envelopes to

Workshop on Economics and Information Security

2002-01-15 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/econws.html Workshop on Economics and Information Security University of California, Berkeley May 16-17, 2002 Do we spend enough on keeping `hackers' out of our computer systems? Do we not spend enough? Or do we spend too much? Many system security

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 15 Jan 2002 09:42:32 +0100, Axel H Horns said: I'm using PGP 6.5.8 for my professional confidential e-mails and sometimes I get complaints from GnuPG users saying they can't use my Pubkey. So, you can't decrypt the attached message? Or does this problem only occur with another

Re: CFP: PKI research workshop

2002-01-15 Thread Eugene Leitl
On Tue, 15 Jan 2002, D. A. Honig wrote: [Moderator's note: Except that's precisely the point: Modulo MIM attacks is like saying we're all immortal, modulo death. The question isn't some sort of mystification of identity -- it is being able to know that you're talking to the same Dear Abby

Re: CFP: PKI research workshop

2002-01-15 Thread D. A. Honig
[The question isn't some sort of mystification of identity -- it is being able to know that you're talking to the same Dear Abby your friends have talked to and that you talked to last week. Here you're talking about reputation of nyms, which doesn't require third parties or certs, just

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Derek Atkins
Is there even development on the PGP (product) line? AFAIK they (NAI) have not release PGP 7.x in source form. Worse, there are a couple of bugs I found in 6.5.8 when I was porting it to Tru64, but who knows if anyone is listening over at NAI. It's a sad state of affairs. Perhaps I should go

Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

2002-01-15 Thread Adam Fields
Thor Lancelot Simon says: Many operating systems use Linux-style (environmental noise stirred with a hash function) generators to provide random and pseudorandom data on /dev/random and /dev/urandom respectively. A few modify the general Linux design by adding an output buffer which is not

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Matt Crawford
Is there even development on the PGP (product) line? AFAIK they (NAI) have not release PGP 7.x in source form. Worse, there are a couple of bugs I found in 6.5.8 when I was porting it to Tru64, but who knows if anyone is listening over at NAI. Years ago I bought a few copies of commercial

Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

2002-01-15 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
This result would seem to raise questions about SHA1 and MD5 as much as about the quality of /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Naively, it should be difficult to create input to these hash functions that cause their output to fail any statistical test. Arnold Reinhold At 3:23 PM -0500 1/15/02,

Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

2002-01-15 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
At 03:23 PM 1/15/2002 -0500, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: Many operating systems use Linux-style (environmental noise stirred with a hash function) generators to provide random and pseudorandom data on /dev/random and /dev/urandom respectively. A few modify the general Linux design by adding an

Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

2002-01-15 Thread Adam Fields
Arnold G. Reinhold says: This result would seem to raise questions about SHA1 and MD5 as much as about the quality of /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Naively, it should be difficult to create input to these hash functions that cause their output to fail any statistical test. I would think

Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

2002-01-15 Thread Jim Gillogly
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: Many operating systems use Linux-style (environmental noise stirred with a hash function) generators to provide random and pseudorandom data on /dev/random and /dev/urandom respectively. ... The usual failure mode is too many runs of 1 1s. Using MD5 instead of

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Will Price
Werner Koch wrote: According to the bug reports I receive for GnuPG, it seems that even the latest versions of PGP (7.0.3?) are still not OpenPGP compatible. No, the latest version for Win32 is 7.1.1, and for MacOS 9 it is 7.1.0. I think it should be pointed out what a loaded statement the

Re: PGP GPG compatibility

2002-01-15 Thread Derek Atkins
Will Price [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The SDK (which still includes little bits of your code Derek, and all other crypto/network/passphrase and even all the UI code which interacts with the crypto related code) has been published up through 7.1.1. The Windows GUI was last published at 6.5.8.