On Sat, Sep 01, 2001 at 11:14:56PM -0500, Frank Tobin wrote:
Simple. The original author should use a trusted time-stamping service to
indicate a trusted 'true' time for the first signature.
Alternatively,
Sure, but this was not part of the proposal.
And I don't know of any existing
On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 10:45:14PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
where the encryption preserves length (e.g., RC4 encryption). Suppose
someone is sending a secret S in these messages, and the attacker gets
to choose some prefix or suffix to send, e.g.
X[0] = S+suffix[0]
X[1] = S+suffix[1]
A german TV news magazine (ZDF spezial) just mentioned that
the terrorists prepared and coordinated
also by using the internet, but no details were told.
Does anyone know more about this?
Hadmut
[Moderator: I've listened to virtually all the news conferences made
so far. The FBI has yet to
On Sun, Sep 16, 2001 at 10:00:21AM +0300, Amir Herzberg wrote:
Suppose by law, everybody can use GAK encryption alg, say `GEEK`. Attacker
wishes to use non-GAK algorithm, say `TRICK`. GEEK has a distinguisher
module available to NSA which outputs GEEK or SUSPECT for encrypted data
(using
On Mon, Sep 17, 2001 at 09:10:48AM -0500, Matt Crawford wrote:
The only details I've heard are that the terrorists have elaborate
web sites to recruit and solicit donations. Far short of
operational use of the internet.
They had two websites in Germany, one for recruiting people
On Fri, Oct 05, 2001 at 01:22:31PM -0500, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
[ Greate description of M$ ... ]
I am unaware of anything microsoft has ever written
that could be considered secure and there is evidence that they plan
Outlook once offered me the choice between no encryption and
a so called
On Thu, Sep 27, 2001 at 10:37:23AM -0400, Pat Farrell wrote:
Does anyone know if there is a legal collector's market for Enigma
machines?
Some years ago, when I was at the university, the institute
had one enigma, which was bought at an auction. If I remember
well, it had cost about DM
WASHINGTON -- Computer hackers, once satisfied to test their skills on
large companies, are turning their sights to home computers that are
faster, more powerful and less secure than ever before.
On my private computer (DSL, dynamically assigned IP address), I
detect an increasing density of
On Fri, Jan 04, 2002 at 11:42:27AM -0800, Jeff Simmons wrote:
Unless I'm misunderstanding you, I find this hard to believe.
On my computer (DSL, fixed IP), which is pretty heavily monitored, I'm
detecting only a few, maybe up to a dozen, actual attacks a day. Most of
them are from
One of the main properties of the TCPA/Palladium
architecture is the (asserted) ability to
limit information leaking to untrusted parties.
In what way does this affect the appearance of
computers as we know them today? It certainly
means more than that you can't simply forward
copyright
On Fri, Jul 05, 2002 at 09:14:27AM +0100, Matthew Byng-Maddick wrote:
On Thu, Jul 04, 2002 at 10:54:11PM +0200, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
[backdoored network cards]
I don't think so. As far as I understood, the
bus system (PCI,...) will be encrypted as well. You'll have
to use a NIC which
Hi,
I just read the latest news in german news
magazine DER SPIEGEL
(http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,206079,00.html
for those who understand german)
about Bush's Freedom Corps and the TIPS starting
in August (Terrorism Information and Prevention System).
They also mentioned that
On Fri, Aug 16, 2002 at 02:23:05AM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
Other explanations?
Same effect here in Germany.
I'm under the impression that security was never really done
for security reasons, but as a kind of fashion. Do it because
everyone is doing it. It's a problem of the decision makers.
Hi,
I'm looking for a court decision about a case where
FBI agents fooled russian hackers in order to gain
their passwords and to intrude their computers.
Unfortunately (or better: fortunately) I'm unexperienced
with the american court system. Can anyone give me
a hint where/how I can get a
On Fri, Sep 20, 2002 at 02:17:11PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
It appears to have replay resistance *between* readers - ie, the data
from reader A would be useless to spoof reader B, since the two readers
will illuminate the device at different locations and angles.
Not really. Illuminating
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 12:11:17AM +, David Wagner wrote:
I find the physical token a poor replacement for cryptography, when the
goal is challenge-response authentication over a network. In practice,
you never really want just challenge-response authentication; you
want to set up a
On Wed, Nov 06, 2002 at 02:24:18PM -0600, Steven Soroka wrote:
Which prompts the question, what the hell for?
That's a pretty good question.
Police and Secret Services demanded wiretapping access
as absolutely necessary for catching criminals etc.
Some politicians agreed for some short time,
Hi,
a lovely anthology of concepts about human and
civil rights (american flavour) can be found at
http://www.darpa.mil/iao/
best regards
Hadmut
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On Wed, Feb 12, 2003 at 06:10:56PM -0500, Matt Blaze wrote:
If I were looking for a winner for this, I'd be especially interested
in measures that end up reducing security rather than improving it.
One of the worst security measures I've ever personally seen:
Some years ago I was invited as
On Fri, Feb 14, 2003 at 02:18:00AM -0800, alan wrote:
The extra anal security guard can be fun to play with.
A little bit more about guards:
In 1985/86 I did my compulsory army service in Koblenz, which
also included to be the guard of the barracks for several days.
When I was the guard of
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