Re: Fw: [ISN] Commentary: The Threat Of Microsofts .Net

2001-10-31 Thread JohnE37179
In a message dated 10/31/01 3:09:38 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: but do not PKI, encryption, [and] digital certificates, de- pending on their use, actually help to PROVE one's identity through reliable, trusted, or otherwise authoritative third parties? In closed systems, yes. However, even

Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-01 Thread JohnE37179
In a message dated 11/1/01 11:09:21 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: It appears that a lot of work has to be done and a lot of money spent before even a small amount of trust in an individual's proof of identity (on a world- or Internet-wide scale) can be established. Not really. The problem

Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-03 Thread JohnE37179
In a message dated 11/2/01 8:46:25 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: the following from a thread on some of the fees related to fraud issues at Again, this is only a very small part of the problem. The Inspector General's office reports that the average identity fraud in the Social Security

Re: when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-05 Thread JohnE37179
In a message dated 11/5/01 10:55:39 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: in the account-based financial transaction ... the requestor is the card-holder/consumer and the authorization or service entity is the card-holder's financial institution. I think you have nailed it on the head. When

Re: when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack

2001-11-05 Thread JohnE37179
In a message dated 11/5/01 11:28:57 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: then you can only 'authenticate' between entities that share some fairly complex secret information. Anything else can be spoofed pretty easily. The information does not have to be secret at all. It can be open, but not