Fw:Fraud voting machines
democracy itself at peril. And, argues Charlie Matulka, for a former officer of one of those corporations to then place himself into an election without disclosing such an apparent conflict of interest is to create a parody of democracy. Perhaps Matulka's been reading too many conspiracy theory tracts. Or maybe he's on to something. We won't know until a truly independent government agency looks into the matter. When Bev Harris and The Hill's Alexander Bolton pressed the Chief Counsel and Director of the Senate Ethics Committee, the man responsible for ensuring that FEC disclosures are complete, asking him why he'd not questioned Hagel's 1995, 1996, and 2001 failures to disclose the details of his ownership in the company that owned the voting machine company when he ran for the Senate, the Director reportedly met with Hagel's office on Friday, January 25, 2003 and Monday, January 27, 2003. After the second meeting, on the afternoon of January 27th, the Director of the Senate Ethics Committee resigned his job. Meanwhile, back in Nebraska, Charlie Matulka had requested a hand count of the vote in the election he lost to Hagel. He just learned his request was denied because, he said, Nebraska has a just-passed law that prohibits government-employee election workers from looking at the ballots, even in a recount. The only machines permitted to count votes in Nebraska, he said, are those made and programmed by the corporation formerly run by Hagel. Matulka shared his news with me, then sighed loud and long on the phone, as if he were watching his children's future evaporate. If you want to win the election, he finally said, just control the machines. Thom Hartmann is the author of Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of Human Rights. www.unequalprotection.com This article is copyright by Thom Hartmann, but permission is granted for reprint in print, email, or web media so long as this credit is attached. http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0131-01.htm -- slainte mhath, RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs --~\ Auto-Free Ottawa! Canada www.TriColour.net--\@ @ www.flora.org/afo/ No Internet Wiretapping!-- _\\/\%___\\/\%Vote! -- Green.ca www.FreeSWAN.org___GTVS6#790__(*)___(*)(*)___www.Marillion.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Columbia crypto box
On Sat, Feb 08, 2003 at 01:36:46PM -0500, Adam Fields wrote: On Sat, Feb 08, 2003 at 01:24:14PM -0500, Tim Dierks wrote: There may be more valid reasons for treating the device as secret; some categories that come to mind include protecting non-cryptographic information, such as the capabilities of the communication channel. Also, many systems on the shuttle are obsolete by modern standards, and it's possible that the communications security is similarly aged. Isn't it also possible that the device contains a physical key of some kind? Right, which should be different for each vehicle/flight and if it is used for control of that particular vehicle/flight, is pretty moot now... Having said that, if there was sensitive content in those transmissions that was in addition to real-time control of the vehicle, there would be a significant interest in preventing others from acquiring it. This seems like a weakness of the system. - Adam slainte mhath, RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs --~\ Auto-Free Ottawa! Canada www.TriColour.net--\@ @ www.flora.org/afo/ No Internet Wiretapping!-- _\\/\%___\\/\%Vote! -- Green.ca www.FreeSWAN.org___GTVS6#790__(*)___(*)(*)___www.Marillion.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[no subject]
On Tue, Dec 04, 2001 at 03:32:04PM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: Actually, the authentication is not performed by Visa, but by the issuer (the member bank that has issued the card). Visa only manages a directory server where the merchant's plugin looks up the first six digits of the card number (a.k.a. the issuer BIN) and finds the URL of the Issuer Authentication Control Server. The merchant plugin then redirects the buyer's browser to that server, which in turn authenticates the buyer in any way it deems fit (normally, a password or PIN). Visa, merchant and acquiring bank are all out of the authentication loop: the process only involves issuer and cardholder. If the authentication is successful, the Issuer ACS certifies the card number (basically, signing it) and redirects the browser to the merchant's plugin, which verifies the issuer's signature (through a Visa-issued root cert) and proceeds. Only then it the transaction submitted for authorization. So if I understand this correctly, if I am running a client, for which there is no plugin, I am screwed? This seems pretty limiting. Enzo slainte mhath, RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs --~\ Auto-Free Ottawa! Canada www.TriColour.net--\@ @ www.flora.org/afo/ No Internet Wiretapping!-- _\\/\%___\\/\%Vote! -- Green.ca www.FreeSWAN.org___GTVS6#790__(*)___(*)(*)___www.Marillion.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
