On Sun, 30 Mar 2003, reusch wrote:
I'm amazed at their claims of radio interception. One would
expect that all US military communications, even trivial ones,
Trivial ones are voice radio. Nontrivially to encrypt (mil people tend to
be conservative), unlike teletype (I've used NEMP-proof
On Sat, 15 Mar 2003, Bill Stewart wrote:
They're probably not independent, but they'll be influenced by lighting,
precise viewing angles, etc., so they're probably nowhere near 100%
correlated either.
I notice the systems mentioned in the study rely on biometrics extracted
from flat images.
On Sun, 16 Mar 2003, Bill Stewart wrote:
You're right that airport security gates are probably a pretty good
consistent place to view the crowd, but getting the target images
is a different problem - some of the Usual Suspects may have police mugshots,
but for most of them it's unlikely that
Some clarification by Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] on why
cryptlib doesn't do timing attack resistance default:
Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
cryptlib was never intended to be a high-performance SSL server (the docs are
fairly clear on this), and I don't think anyone is using it to
On Sat, 15 Mar 2003, Anonymous wrote:
Microsoft's point with regard to DRM has always been that Palladium had
other uses besides that one which everyone was focused on. Obviously
Of course it's useful. Does the usefulness outweigh the support for
special interests (DRM, governments, software
Unfortunately no one can accept in good faith a single word coming out of
Redmond. Biddle has been denying Pd can be used for DRM in presentation
(xref Lucky Green subsequent patent claims to call the bluff), however in
recent (of this week) Focus interview Gates explicitly stated it does.
This
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 03:12:30 +0100 (CET)
From: Robert Harley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Help!
Help!
I need access to a big fast machine ASAP, to count points on a
humongous elliptic curve. That requires running a process that
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Mon, 02 Dec 2002 12:25:39 -0500
From: Zooko [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [mnet-devel] Ditching crypto++ for pycrypto
I have to admit that Crypto++'s build/port problems suck, a lot. I still have a
1) What's the name of the technique of salting/padding an small integer
I'm signing with random data?
2) If I'm signing above short (~1 kBit) sequences, can I sign them
directly, or am I supposed to hash them first? (i.e. does a presence
of an essentially fixed field weaken the
On 24 Jul 2002, Paul Crowley wrote:
I can't believe any compression software could be as fast as just
feeding the signal straight into SHA-1.
I haven't tried this, but assuming I'm digitizing dark video and only get
noise in the lower significant bits I can just mask out the constant
(zero)
On Mon, 22 Jul 2002, David Honig wrote:
Yes, it is a joke. However, it is also a viable if low-bandwidth
entropy source. I disagree that you need to be able to model
I've got a framegrabber with a 640x480 24 bit/pixel camera. It doesn't
compress, is rather noisy, and since self-adjusting I
On Mon, 22 Jul 2002, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
Can american software be trusted anymore, when the
US government wants to turn 4% of the US citizens
into spys?
Wrong question. The right (albeit rhetorical) question: can closed source
software, regardless of its point of origin, be trusted, at
On Mon, 13 May 2002, bear wrote:
One thousand years = 10 iterations of Moore's law plus one year.
Call it 15-16 years? Or maybe 20-21 since Moore's seems to have
gotten slower lately?
Moore's law is about integration density. That has zero to do with
problem-specific system performance.
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