the money issued. And not
be reliant on one computer to keep the records.
Or the propounders wanting to: make a profit/control the bank?
--
Peter Fairbrother
(who's drunk now, but will be sober tomorrow, and may regret posting
.
Makes Tempest look like a toy. Nice (?) one, Markus.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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confirmation is exactly where
it isn't. We have credit cards for that. Cash needs to be authenticatable by
humans alone.
-- Peter Fairbrother
Sampo Syreeni wrote:
On Mon, 11 Feb 2002, Trei, Peter wrote:
That's the scenario which is (semi) worrying. As the tagged bills wear,
some fraction
of
persistant keys for encryption in both PGP and GPG make them unsuitable for
GAK resistance, and if you haven't got GAK yet, you might get it someday,
making all your present traffic insecure.
-- Peter Fairbrother
Pete Chown wrote:
John Gilmore wrote:
Brad Templeton has been kicking around some ideas
the defence/Court, or
perhaps it's just legalese, I don't know.
-- Peter Fairbrother
David Wagner wrote:
It seems the FBI hopes the law will make a distinction between software
that talks directly to the modem and software that doesn't. They note
that PGP falls into the latter category
Capturing keystrokes of email in composition would appear to me to be part
of a transfer of ..intelligence of any nature transmitted ... in part by a
wire..., and nothing to do with stored email or 2703, but I am not a
lawyer.
-- Peter Fairbrother
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
[snip
use other sources of entropy as well).
-- Peter Fairbrother
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-rng, which is to
deliberately repeat random output for debugging, replaying games, etc. Not
very relevant to crypto, except perhaps as part of an attack strategy.
-- Peter
On Wed, 19 Sep 2001, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
Bram Cohen wrote:
You only have to do it once at startup to get enough
think of anything that
would actually work against terrorists.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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Ray Dillinger at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It is time to move the conference because it is no longer safe for
cryptography researchers to enter the USA.
Bear
I'm worried about the long-term National Security implications. If DMCA
stands and US cryptography researchers are imprisoned en
Given: an online Steganographic Filing System database based on the second
construction of Anderson, Needham and Shamir*, with many users. Users write
email to the data base, with random cover writes. They read from the
database to collect their mail, reads are covered by random cover reads, and
Bram Cohen at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[..]
I can't emphasize enough that it's very important that the form factor be
a double-female phone jack and work when plugged in with *either*
orientation - is this an easy thing to detect?
Surely a male-to-female jack. Plug it (male) into the wall
John Denker at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I was talking with some colleagues who had read the WSJ article
http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB990563785151302644.htm
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2764372,00.html for
and who were wondering as follows: Given that
Amir Herzberg at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[..]
This takes care reasonably well of peer to peer e-mail (I think), and can be
easily deployed (any volunteers? I'll be very glad to provide our system for
this !). As to mailing lists like this one... Here one solution is manual
moderating, of
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