[no subject]
Adam Back writes a very thorough analysis of possible consequences of the amazing power of the TCPA/Palladium model. He is clearly beginning to get it as far as what this is capable of. There is far more to this technology than simple DRM applications. In fact Adam has a great idea for how this could finally enable selling idle CPU cycles while protecting crucial and sensitive business data. By itself this could be a killer app for TCPA/Palladium. And once more people start thinking about how to exploit the potential, there will be no end to the possible applications. Of course his analysis is spoiled by an underlying paranoia. So let me ask just one question. How exactly is subversion of the TPM a greater threat than subversion of your PC hardware today? How do you know that Intel or AMD don't already have back doors in their processors that the NSA and other parties can exploit? Or that Microsoft doesn't have similar backdoors in its OS? And similarly for all the other software and hardware components that make up a PC today? In other words, is this really a new threat? Or are you unfairly blaming TCPA for a problem which has always existed and always will exist? - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[no subject]
,,Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations'' Nicolas Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/044/ Abstract: Several recently proposed ciphers are built with layers of small S-boxes, interconnected by linear key-dependent layers. Their security relies on the fact, that the classical methods of cryptanalysis (e.g. linear or differential attacks) are based on probabilistic characteristics, which makes their security grow exponentially with the number of rounds Nr. In this paper we study the security of such ciphers under an additional hypothesis: the S-box can be described by an overdefined system of algebraic equations (true with probability 1). We show that this hypothesis is true for both Serpent (due to a small size of S-boxes) and Rijndael (due to unexpected algebraic properties). -- Pawe Krawczyk * http://echelon.pl/kravietz/ Krakow, Poland * http://ipsec.pl/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[no subject]
On Tue, Dec 04, 2001 at 03:32:04PM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: Actually, the authentication is not performed by Visa, but by the issuer (the member bank that has issued the card). Visa only manages a directory server where the merchant's plugin looks up the first six digits of the card number (a.k.a. the issuer BIN) and finds the URL of the Issuer Authentication Control Server. The merchant plugin then redirects the buyer's browser to that server, which in turn authenticates the buyer in any way it deems fit (normally, a password or PIN). Visa, merchant and acquiring bank are all out of the authentication loop: the process only involves issuer and cardholder. If the authentication is successful, the Issuer ACS certifies the card number (basically, signing it) and redirects the browser to the merchant's plugin, which verifies the issuer's signature (through a Visa-issued root cert) and proceeds. Only then it the transaction submitted for authorization. So if I understand this correctly, if I am running a client, for which there is no plugin, I am screwed? This seems pretty limiting. Enzo slainte mhath, RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs --~\ Auto-Free Ottawa! Canada www.TriColour.net--\@ @ www.flora.org/afo/ No Internet Wiretapping!-- _\\/\%___\\/\%Vote! -- Green.ca www.FreeSWAN.org___GTVS6#790__(*)___(*)(*)___www.Marillion.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No Subject
At 02:14 PM 9/17/01 -0400, Jim Windle wrote: Second, if we assume for a minute that the terrorist use public key systems Given their 1. quality opsec including 2. wise avoidance of wireless phones, etc, and their 3. dependence on long-time personal contacts, isn't it more likely that private keys on floppies (or CDs) would be used? 3. is hardest and most valuable. The fact that they are 4. ideologically motivated, (rather than financially or by ego) makes it even tougher. If a *utility knife* is a *skyscraper disassembly tool*, worrying about the code is irrelevent. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
