Broiles [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], James M Galvin
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: non-repudiation, was Re: crypto flaw in secure mail standards
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
one of the biggest problems that has led to most of the regulations
to EKR [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC
cc: Greg Broiles [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], James M Galvin
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: non-repudiation, was Re: crypto flaw in secure mail
true ... but it wasn't standard business practice ... there were all sorts
of options ... the issue was what were the standard business practices
actually followed.
I believe that there is a thread from two years ago on this specific
subject ... where somebody associated with SET explicitly
one of the biggest problems that has led to most of the regulations is the
ease that account-number harvesting can occur and then the account number
used in fraudulent, non-authenticated transactions. The SET-like protocols
didn't address this issue. However, there is a huge amount of stuff
... and the x9.59 solution was designed to be applicable to all
account-based, electronic payments not just credit ... but all.
much of the regs. are specific to credit (because of the ease that
account-number harvesting can lead to fraudulent, non-authenticated
transactions) ... while
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
one of the biggest problems that has led to most of the regulations is the
ease that account-number harvesting can occur and then the account number
used in fraudulent, non-authenticated transactions. The SET-like protocols
didn't address this issue.
How so? In at
