Trei, Peter wrote:
marius[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote:
marius wrote:
Not quite true. Encrypting each message twice would not increase the
effective key size to 112 bits.
There is an attack named meet in the middle which will make the
effective key size to be just 63
Joshua Hill wrote:
marius wrote:
Not quite true. Encrypting each message twice would not increase the
effective key size to 112 bits.
There is an attack named meet in the middle which will make the
effective key size to be just 63 bits.
Peter Trei wrote:
Don't forget that the MITM
:57 AM
To: marius
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Losing the Code War by Stephen Budiansky
marius wrote:
But there was an utterly trivial fix that DES users could employ if
they were worried
about security: they could simply encrypt each message twice, turning
56-bit DES
At 11:00 AM -0500 2/4/02, Trei, Peter wrote:
Don't forget that the MITM attack (which Schneier claims
takes 2^(2n) = 2^112 time), also requires 2^56 blocks
of storage. That's a lot, and the attack ceases to be
parallelizable, unlike the straight brute-force attack.
In fact, it's utterly
Ben wrote:
marius wrote:
...
Not quite true. Encrypting each message twice would not increase the
effective key size to 112 bits.
There is an attack named meet in the middle which will make the
effective key size to be just 63 bits.
?? 56 bits plus a little, surely.
The `meet in the
Amir Herzberg wrote:
The `meet in the middle` attack works against double encryption; that's
why Triple DES is performing three DES operations with two keys.
Some variants use 3 keys, in fact.
Cheers,
Ben.
--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/
There is no
marius wrote:
But there was an utterly trivial fix that DES users could employ if
they were worried
about security: they could simply encrypt each message twice, turning
56-bit DES into 112-bit DES, and squaring the number of key sequences
that
a code breaker would have to try. Messages
