At 9:08 AM -0400 4/17/02, Russell Nelson wrote:
The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid
people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use
cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty
threat model, then by definition you're paranoid.
Nah. Paranoia
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid
people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use
cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty
threat model, then by definition you're paranoid.
I think it's
The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid
people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use
cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty
threat model, then by definition you're paranoid.
Uh, I don't have to run faster than the bear I
Derek Atkins writes:
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid
people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use
cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty
threat model, then by definition
Dan Geer writes:
The union of the two sets of cryptography users and paranoid
people is necessarily non-empty. Who would bother to use
cryptography sans a threat model? And if you've got a non-empty
threat model, then by definition you're paranoid.
Uh, I don't have
Russell Nelson[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote
Derek Atkins writes:
I think it's really about degree. I don't agree that having a
non-empty threat model implies you a paranoid.
Yes, you're right (and Phil Pennock points out that I meant
intersection, not union). Dictionary.com defines
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
So what *is* the right word for having a non-empty threat model for
moderate and rational reasons?
Shrewd.
--
Matt Curtin Interhack Corp +1 614 545 HACK http://web.interhack.com/
Author, Developing Trust: Online Privacy and Security (Apress,
Businesses today could
reasonably be content with their 1024-bit keys, and military institutions
and those paranoid enough to fear from them should have upgraded years ago.
To me, the big news in Lucky Green's announcement is not that he believes
that Bernstein's research is
On Tue, Apr 16, 2002 at 08:44:06PM +0200, Anonymous wrote:
Bruce Schneier writes in the April 15, 2002, CRYPTO-GRAM,
http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0204.html:
But there's no reason to panic, or to dump existing systems. I don't think
Bernstein's announcement has changed
Does anyone else notice the contradiction in these two paragraphs?
First Bruce says that businesses can reasonably be content with 1024 bit
keys, then he appears shocked that Lucky Green still has a 1024 bit key?
The big news is does not mean the same as I'm shocked that. He appears to agree
Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Bruce Schneier writes in the April 15, 2002, CRYPTO-GRAM,
http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0204.html:
But there's no reason to panic, or to dump existing systems. I don't think
Bernstein's announcement has changed anything. Businesses today
On Tue, 16 Apr 2002, Anonymous wrote:
Bruce Schneier writes in the April 15, 2002, CRYPTO-GRAM,
http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0204.html:
But there's no reason to panic, or to dump existing systems. I don't think
Bernstein's announcement has changed anything. Businesses today
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