Actually, dictionary attacks reveal about sixty percent of passwords,
so for every six passwords you find on a dictionary attack, you can
infer ten actual stegotexts times the ratio between your analyzed and
discovered (possibly-false) positives.
This presumes that people who use
Grant Bayley wrote:
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From: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: nettime Pirate Utopia, FEED, February 20, 2001
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 08:37:20 -0500
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL
On Fri, Sep 21, 2001 at 06:19:43PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
My point was higher level. These systems are either already broken or
fragile and very lightly peer reviewed. There aren't many people
building and breaking them.
To elaborate on this slightly. There are inherent reasons why
--
On 22 Sep 2001, at 16:11, Adam Back wrote:
There will be a never-ended stream of more refined and
accurate models of the signal itself, and biases in the
equipment that collects the signal. So there will be
always a risk that the detecter gets the edge by marginally
more accurately
Hi to you all! A word on this thread. I think you are giving missleading
assertions. It's just a subtlety I'd like to mention.
Perhaps you should simply notice that getting a one-use-only webmail
email account and sending the message the bird is flying home or any
James Bondish message like
My point was higher level. These systems are either already broken or
fragile and very lightly peer reviewed. There aren't many people
building and breaking them.
I did read the papers; my summary is the above, and from that I
surmise it would not be wise for a terrorist to use current
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Status: U
From: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: nettime Pirate Utopia, FEED, February 20, 2001
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 08:37:20 -0500
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Key concepts: steganography
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Status: U
From: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: nettime Pirate Utopia, FEED, February 20, 2001
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 08:37:20 -0500
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Julian Dibbell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Key concepts
Also it's interesting to note that it appears from Niels Provos and
Peter Honeymans paper that none of the currently available stego
encoding programs are secure. They have broken them all (at least I
recognise the main stego programs available in their list of systems
their tools can attack),
