At 9:45 AM -0700 on 5/13/02, bear wrote:
> One thousand years = 10 iterations of Moore's law plus one year.
> Call it 15-16 years? Or maybe 20-21 since Moore's seems to have
> gotten slower lately?
Moore himself said in an article in Forbes a few years ago that the cost of
fabs themselves woul
On Mon, 13 May 2002, bear wrote:
> One thousand years = 10 iterations of Moore's law plus one year.
> Call it 15-16 years? Or maybe 20-21 since Moore's seems to have
> gotten slower lately?
Moore's law is about integration density. That has zero to do with
problem-specific system performance. T
On Fri, 26 Apr 2002, Anonymous wrote:
>These estimates are very helpful. Thanks for providing them. It seems
>that, based on the factor base size derived from Bernstein's asymptotic
>estimates, the machine is not feasible and would take thousands of years
>to solve a matrix. If the 50 times
Wei Dai writes:
> Using a factor base size of 10^9, in the relationship finding phase you
> would have to check the smoothness of 2^89 numbers, each around 46 bits
> long. (See Frog3's analysis posted at
> http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography%40wasabisystems.com/msg01833.html.
> Those number
Sorry, there's a mistake in my post, which makes the relationship finding
phase look easier than it actually is. BTW, why did it take 5 days for
that post to go through?
On Wed, Apr 24, 2002 at 12:30:26PM -0700, Wei Dai wrote:
> Using a factor base size of 10^9, in the relationship finding phase
At 05:52 PM 4/23/2002 Tuesday, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
>[...] And if the reason for the 256 bits is the possible deployment,
>sometimes in the future, of quantum computers, well in that case we should
>stop using PK cryptography altogether.
Hi Enzo!
Disclaimer: I am not a quantum mechanic, and
At 08:52 AM 04/24/2002 +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
>In particular, none of the naysayers explained me clearly why it should be
>reasonable to use 256-bit ciphers like AES with 1024-bit PK keypairs. Even
>before Bernstein's papers it was widely accepted that bruteforcing a 256-bit
>cipher requi
Lucky Green writes:
> Given how panels are assembled and the role they fulfill, I thought it
> would be understood that when one writes that certain results came out
> of a panel that this does not imply that each panelist performed the
> same calculations. But rather that that the information gai
Nicko van Someren writes:
> I used the number 10^9 for the factor base size (compared to about
> 6*10^6 for the break of the 512 bit challenge) and 10^11 for the
> weight of the matrix (compared to about 4*10^8 for RSA512). Again
> these were guesses and they certainly could be out by an order of
I have one other question about the panel analysis. Why did it focus only
on the linear algebra part of the NFS algorithm? I would like to know,
given the same assumption on the factor base size (10^9), how much would
it cost to build a machine that can perform the relationship finding phase
o
Paul Crowley writes:
> Silverman is AFAICT the most knowledgeable person to have commented on
> all this. He has no axe to grind, unless you count the inexcusably
> unfair treatment he received from RSA.
>
> All of his sci.crypt comments are available with this search:
>
> http://groups.google.c
Enzo wrote:
> Further to Lucky's comments: in the last few days I have
> discussed keysize issues with a few people on a couple of
> mailing lists, and I have encountered a hostility to large
> keysizes of which, frankly, I don't understand the reasons.
> On the client side at least, performan
Further to Lucky's comments: in the last few days I have discussed keysize
issues with a few people on a couple of mailing lists, and I have
encountered a hostility to large keysizes of which, frankly, I don't
understand the reasons. On the client side at least, performance is not an
issue: PGP 7.
Anonymous wrote (quoting Adam):
> Adam Back wrote:
> > The mocking tone of recent posts about Lucky's call seems quite
> > misplaced given the checkered bias and questionable
> authority of the
> > above conflicting claims we've seen quoted.
>
> No, Lucky made a few big mistakes. First, he in
Nicko writes:
> [...] the Bernstein proposal [...] (among other things) it details
> the conceptual design of a machine for computing kernels in a large,
> sparse matrix. The design talks of the number of functional units
> and the nature of the communication between these units. What I set
> ou
Anonymous wrote:
> Nicko van Someren writes:
>>The estimate
>>of the cost of construction I gave was "some hundreds of
>>millions of dollars", a figure by which I still stand.
>>
>
> But what does that mean, to specify (and stand by) the cost of
> construction of a factoring machine, without say
Nicko van Someren writes:
> The estimate
> of the cost of construction I gave was "some hundreds of
> millions of dollars", a figure by which I still stand.
But what does that mean, to specify (and stand by) the cost of
construction of a factoring machine, without saying anything about how
fast
> - Forwarded message from Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
>
> To: Cryptography <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: objectivity and factoring analysis
> Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 14:51:59 +01
Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> - Bob Silverman, former RSA factoring expert, observes on sci.crypt,
> quote:
>
> > At this point, there is noone left at RSA Labs who has the expertise
> > or knowledge to judge Bernstein's work.
Silverman is AFAICT the most knowledgeable person to have c
I'd just like to make a few comments about the apparently unnoticed or
unstated conflicts of interest and bias in the analysis surrounding
Bernstein's proposal.
The following is not intended to trample on anyone's ego -- but I
think deserves saying.
- I'm not sure any of the respondents so far e
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